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PURPOSE AND EFFECT IN SHERMAN ACT
CONSPIRACIES
Richard S. Wirtz*
[A] conspiracy must be a combination of two or more persons, by some
concerted action, to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose, or to
accomplish some purpose, not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal
or unlawful means.
-Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Hunt'
Every corporation engaged in business must be responsible for the ten-
dency of its business, whether lawful or unlawful. . . .To require the
intentions of a corporation to be proven ... would defeat the object of the
law.
-Senator John Sherman on the Senate Floor, March 21, 18902
The offense of conspiracy, it is said, is predominantly mental. 3 Two
"intents" are required for its commission-the intent to agree, and the
intent to achieve an unlawful objective.4 An agreement among two or
more persons to achieve an unlawful objective is a crime though it is
never implemented5 and though the parties, had they tried to implement
it, would have failed. 6 What makes it unlawful as a conspiracy is not its
actual or probable effects, but the "common purpose to attain an objec-
tive covered by the law." 7
These doctrines have substantially influenced the construction by lower
federal courts of the proscription in section 1 of the Sherman Act of 18908
against "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." Justice Holmes' characterization of
conspiracy as a "partnership in criminal purposes" 9 has found its way
into pattern jury instructions frequently given in section 1 cases:
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee; A.B., 1961, Amherst College; M.P.A.,
1963, Princeton University; J.D., 1970, Stanford University. Thanks to Neil Cohen, James Gobert,
Jerry Phillips, and James Rahl for encouragement and criticism, and to Sandra McCrea and Deborah
Smith for help in research.
1. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 123 (1842).
2. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
3. E.g., Hamo, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 624,.632 (1941).
4. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 61, at 464 (1972).
5. Id. § 62, at 476.
6. Id. § 62, at 474.
7. Id. § 61, at 464.
8. Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
9. United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601,608 (1910).
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A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons, by concerted ac-
tion, to accomplish some unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some lawful
purpose by unlawful means. So, a conspiracy is a kind of "partnership in
criminal purposes," in which every member becomes the agent of every
other member. 10
Juries have been routinely instructed that, to form a section I combination
or conspiracy, two or more persons must have an agreement or under-
standing that they will act together for an "unlawful purpose."'1 They
may be told that the defendants have violated the law only if "the purpose
of the contract, or of the conspiracy was to achieve an objective that
10. 2 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 27.04 (3d ed.
1977). See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION. JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST CASES
1964-1976 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (compilation of jury instruc-
tions given in criminal cases under the antitrust laws). The quoted instruction was given, for exam-
ple, in the following cases: United States v. General Motors Corp., 352 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Mich.
1973): United States v. Colley Enterprises, Inc., Crim. No. W-72-CR-34 (W.D. Tex. 1973):
United States v. Oregon Restaurant & Beverage Ass'n. Crim. No. 68-162 (D. Or. 1968). aff'd. 429
F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Rubino Builders, Inc.. 1967 Trade Cas. (CCH) r 72,076
(D. Md. Apr. 12, 1967). See CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS. supra, ch. 10. Note also the instruction
given by the trial court and approved by the Fifth Circuit in Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571
F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1978), a civil case, as reported in ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 74 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (an antitrust con-
spiracy is "a kind of partnership of unlawful purposes").
11. See, e.g., 1980 CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 10, at 79 (reporting the instruction
given in Harlem River Consumers Coop. v. Associated Grocers, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D.N.Y.
1976)) ("In determining whether each defendant became a member of the conspiracy you must deter-
mine not only whether the defendant you are considering participated in it, but also whether that
defendant did so with knowledge of its unlawful purposes"); CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS. supra
note 10, at 68 (instruction given in United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 281 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd byi. an eqtally' divided court, 404
U.S. 548 (1972) (To be guilty of a § I conspiracy. "two or more persons must enter into a mutual
agreement or understanding that they will act together for an unlawful purpose .... It is the agree-
ment to act together for an unlawful objective that constitutes the gist of this crime-): id. at 55
(instruction given in United States v. Interborough Delicatessen Dealers Ass'n. 23 F. Supp. 230
(S.D.N.Y. 1964)) (To constitute a Sherman Act conspiracy, it "'is essential ... that some character
of manner or communication take place between [two or more persons] sufficient to enable them to
reach a definite mutual understanding of [a) common unlawful objective or purpose to be thereafter
accomplished").
Similar instructions were given in the following cases, among others: Wood v. Gulf Oil Corp.. No.
Mo-77-CA-90 (W.D. Tex. 1978), see 1980 CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 10. at 81: United
States v. Bridge Constr. Corp., Crim. No. 64-28 (S.D. Me. 1965), United States v. H. P. Hood &
Sons, Inc., Crim. No. 63-1 10-c (D. Mass. 1965), and United States v. Johns-Manville Corp.. 231
F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1964), see CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 10. at 44. 53. 58:
Crown Packers v. Peelers Co., Civ. No. 2797 (W.D. Wash. 1966), and Adams Dairy Co. v. Saint
Louis Dairy Co. (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958), see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION.
ANTITRUST CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 28, 31 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 CIVIL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS].
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would create an unreasonable restraint on interstate . . . commerce." 12
Sometimes the forbidden objective is defined in specific terms; 13 often it
is cast more generally as a purpose to "stifle or exclude competition" 14 or
to "restrain trade." 15
However well these statements comport with traditional conspiracy
doctrine, as instructions on the law of Sherman Act conspiracies they are
anomalous. For more than eighty years the Supreme Court has consis-
tently held that wrongful or unlawful purpose is not an indispensable ele-
ment of the offense defined by section 1 of the Sherman Act. In 1897, in
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 16 the Court struck
down the defendants' rate-fixing scheme on the ground that an agreement
whose "direct, immediate, and necessary effect" is to restrain trade or
commerce is unlawful "without proof. . . that [it] was entered into for
the purpose of restraining trade." 1 7 The principle applied was well estab-
lished in the common law on which the drafters of the Sherman Act drew
for guidance in 1890.18 Spokesmen for both parties endorsed it on the
floor of the Senate during the 1890 debates. 19 In subsequent decisions the
12. SEVENTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITrEE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL ON
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES § 801 -1; cf. 1980 CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 10, at 79 (reporting the instruction given by the trial court in Hanson v. Shell Oil Co. (D. Ariz.),
aff'd, 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976)) ("It is enough that Defendant... be shown to have knowledge
that the party whom he was assisting was engaged in a common and unlawful plan").
13. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 10, at 50 (reporting the instruction given
in United States v. Federaci6n de Transporte, Crim. No. 870 (D.P.R. 1971)) ("In this case, conspir-
acy means an agreement, arrived at by two or more persons .... for the purpose of raising truck
rates .... ").
14. See, e.g., 1972 CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 11, at 25 (reporting the instruction
given in Paramount Loew's (Syndicate Theatres, Inc.) v. Warner Bros. (D. Ind. 1963)) ("A combi-
nation is a joining or uniting together between two or more persons having for its object to stifle or
exclude competition, or otherwise to interfere with the normal course of trade under conditions of
free competition").
15. See, e.g., id. at 39 (reporting the instruction given in Westcoast Broadcasting Co. v. Jerrold
Electronics Corp. [sic] (W.D. Wash.), aff'd, 341 F.2d 653 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817
(1965)):
A combination or conspiracy, as used in the antitrust laws . . . means an agreement...
directed toward unreasonable restraint... of interstate trade and commerce.... In other words,
if restraint ... of interstate trade or commerce is sought to be effected, and two or more persons,
actuated by the common purpose of accomplishing that end, work together in furtherance
thereof, every one of such persons becomes a member of the combination or conspiracy.
16. 166U.S.290(1897).
17. Id. at342.
18. See text accompanying notes 90-92 infra.
19. In the debate on the bill, there was considerable discussion of the matter of "intent." Senator
George of Alabama, a leader of the Democratic opposition to the bill, argued that to require proof as
to the defendants' state of mind would render the new legislation almost wholly ineffective:
[I]t must be noted that the bill deals only with agreements, arrangements, and combinations. It
denounces and punishes these when made with a certain intent, but it neither punishes nor af-
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Court has repeatedly confirmed it.20 In section 1 cases, proof of a purpose
to injure competition is relevant, but it is not essential: the Act condemns
agreements that are unreasonably anticompetitive in purpose or effect. 2'
At the heart of the problem is the fact that the antitrust laws do not
proscribe "restraint of trade" as such. 22 Since there is no substantive of-
fense corresponding to the offense of "contract, combination ... or con-
spiracy" defined by section 1, if anticompetitive purpose were required
for a violation, concerted action resulting in severe and unjustified injury
fects in the least any act done in pursuance of these combinations. It ... treats these things when
done as perfectly lawful, as harmless, even meritorious.
[This requirement of specific intent] is ... a very serious obstacle ... in enforcing the bill as
a law.
21 CONG. REC. 1765, 1766 (1890). Senator Sherman, once he got the floor, set the record straight.
Senator George had the wrong text before him: "The word 'intention' is not in the bill .... It was a
proposed amendment ... and was never adopted." Id. at 2461. In principle, Senator George and the
other opponents of an "intent" requirement were absolutely right:
In providing a remedy the intention of the combination is immaterial .... If the natural effects
of [the acts of a corporation] are injurious, if they tend to produce evil results, if their policy is
denounced by the law as against the common good, it may be restrained, be punished with a
penalty or with damages, and in a proper case it may be deprived of its corporate powers and
franchises ...
• . . Every corporation engaged in business must be responsible for the tendency of its busi-
ness, whether lawful or unlawful. . . . To require the intentions of a corporation to be proven.
. would defeat the object of the law.
Id. at 2456-57 (remarks of Sen. Sherman). See generally H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY 174-79 (1955).
20. See text accompanying notes 108-127 infra.
21. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980) (stating the principle for civil cases):
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n. 13 (1978)(same): Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100.
105 (1948); Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 577 (1925): American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 400 (1921); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1. 59 (1911);
Joe Reguiera, Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 642 F.2d 826, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1981): Program
Eng'r. Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 634 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1980); Aladdin Oil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1979); Foster v. Maryland State Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 590 F.2d 928, 933 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979): Fount-Wip.
Inc. v. Reddi-Wip, Inc., 568 F.2d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1978); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 563
F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 542 F.2d 466, 470 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons., Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 78 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1062 (1970); Bank of Utah v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 369 F.2d 19, 24 (10th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 71 (1977).
22. [T]o the common law lawyers of 1890, a direct prohibition of restraint of trade would have
seemed meaningless. The phrase was the creature of the English courts in private suits for the
enforcement of an agreement by the defendant to refrain from competing with the plain-
tiff . . . . Restraint of trade could not come into being without the exchange of promises of
two persons.
Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL L. REV. 743, 745 (1950).
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to competition would frequently escape the condemnation of the law. Re-
peatedly, in order to reach such conduct, the Supreme Court has held that
anticompetitive purpose is not essential to a section 1 violation. 23 In jury
instructions in both civil and criminal cases, these holdings are occasion-
ally acknowledged. 24 To make the instructions intelligible to jurors in
particular cases, however, judges have had to grapple with difficult ques-
tions that the Court has not fully answered: (1) What exactly is a "con-
tract, combination.., or conspiracy" under section 1, if not a "partner-
ship in criminal purposes"? (2) How, except by reference to the parties'
purposes, is a court to decide whether a given restraint on competition
rises to the level of "restraint of trade"? (3) What, if anything, justifies
the application of the severe sanctions prescribed by Congress for viola-
tions of the Sherman Act25 to persons entirely innocent of any conscious
wrongdoing? Judges facing these questions have frequently fallen back
on safe, traditional formulations of conspiracy under which such ques-
tions do not arise.
Contributing to the courts' difficulties in this area is a factor that may at
first appear ironic: great importance is assigned, in the law of section 1, to
the actor's purpose. While a section 1 "contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy" may be formed without the connivance of the parties in a
deliberate scheme to subvert competition, proof of such a scheme clearly
suffices. 26 Though proof that the parties acted with a purpose to injure
competition is not essential to a finding that their agreement was in re-
straint of trade, proof that this was their sole or primary purpose is held to
be conclusive against them on that issue.27
23. The cases are discussed in the text accompanying notes 93-127 infra.
24. See, e.g., 1972 CIVIL JURY INSTRUCrTIONS, supra note 11, at 3 (reporting the instruction given
in Kenpmore-Louis Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's Boston Theatres, Inc., Civ. No. 59-184-J (D. Mass.
1963))'("[Iln order to constitute a violation of Section I . . . a conspiracy must be for the purpose
of or have the effect of unreasonably restraining . . . trade .... ").
25. Section 1 of the Sherman Act as enacted provided that "[elvery person who shall make any
such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor .... ." Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). In 1974 Congress raised the offense to a felony.
Antitrust Procedures & Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976)). Criminal violations are punishable by imprisonment for up to three years or by
fines up to $100,000 for an individual and up to $1,000,000 for corporations, or by both fine and
imprisonment.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, enacted in 1.914 to replace a similar provision of the original Sherman
Act, provides "[t]hat any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor .. . and shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat.
731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)).
26. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); East-
em States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
27. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899); see text accompanying notes 51-70 infra.
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Recently the Supreme Court, in United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 28 has for the first time in the history of the Sherman Act squarely
addressed the issue of the relevance of purpose in connection with crimi-
nal violations of section 1. In its carefully worded opinion the Court, after
considering at length whether a purpose to restrain trade is an indispens-
able element of a section 1 violation, concluded that it is not. 29 It held,
however, that to sustain a criminal conviction it must be shown that the
defendants acted with knowledge that their conduct would have anticom-
petitive effects. 30 Thus Gypsum, while it reinforces prior holdings estab-
lishing that bad purpose is inessential in section 1 cases, inserts a new
and, inevitably, troublesome variable into the calculus with which law-
yers, entrepreneurs, and lower courts must deal.
The Gypsum decision supplies the proper occasion for a renewed effort
to sort out and line up the Court's pronouncements since Trans-Missouri
concerning the respective functions in cases arising under section 1 of
proof of anticompetitive purpose and effect. Once this is done, a reason-
ably coherent body of doctrine emerges and the unresolved issues come
more clearly into focus. The first two sections of this article deal with
purpose and effect as determinants, respectively, of "restraint of trade"
and of "contract, combination . . . and conspiracy." 3 1 The third sec-
tion takes up the problems that arise when the doctrine that bad purpose
need not be shown in section 1 cases-a doctrine developed primarily in
suits in equity-is applied to criminal cases and civil actions for treble
damages.32
I. RESTRAINT OF TRADE
In the analysis of restraint of trade under section 1, the proper starting
points are the Rule of Reason decisions of 1911. In Standard Oil Co. v.
United States33 and United States v. American Tobacco Co.,34 the Su-
preme Court declared that section 1 prohibits only those "contracts or
28. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
29. Id. at 443.
30. Id.
31. Because the criteria for contract, combination, and conspiracy have been shaped to fit he
criteria for restraint of trade, it is useful to take up the latter first.
32. Throughout this article, the term "agreement" will serve as shorthand for the Sherman Act's
expression -contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy.'" In generalizing
about the conditions under which agreements violate § 1, I mean to refer only to agreements that
satisfy the § I requirement of trade or commerce "among the several states, or with foreign nations."
15 U.S.C. § I (1976).
33. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
34. 221 U.S. 106(1911).
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acts which [are] unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions, ' 35
and fixed the basic terms of the inquiry into reasonableness. Under the
Court's formulation in Standard Oil, a restraint may be determined to be
unreasonable "either from the nature or character of the contract or act or
where the [facts] give rise to the inference . . . that [it was] entered into
or done with the intent to do wrong to the general public.' '36 In American
Tobacco the Court restated the categories more succinctly: acts and agree-
ments might be held to violate section 1 "either because of their inherent
nature or effect or because of [their] evident purpose. ",37
From these decisions springs the doctrine that contracts, combinations
and conspiracies violate section 1 when they are unreasonably anticom-
petitive in either purpose or effect. 38 Agreements that "eliminate,"
"hamper,' ''injure,' ''restrict," "restrain," "limit," "harm," "di-
minish," "chill," or "clog" competition may be unlawful under section
1 even though the parties' purposes are wholly neutral or benign. 39 Con-
versely, "even otherwise reasonable trade arrangements must fall if con-
ceived to achieve forbidden ends";40 agreements entered into for the pur-
pose of injuring or of restraining competition may violate section 1,
though they have had no demonstrable impact.
In principle, then, there are two branches to the Rule of Reason-two
tests for reasonableness, two ways an agreement may fail. That much is
clear. What is less clear is the nature and relationship of those two tests.
The problem is complicated by the fact that, in the course of construing
section 1, the Supreme Court has laid down "per se rules" defining
classes of agreements "which because of their pernicious effect on com-
petition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable.' '41 These rules have taken on lives of their own and, in any
treatment of purpose and effect under section 1, they require separate
consideration.
From an analysis of the major decisions under the Rule of Reason, two
substantially independent tests for "restraint of trade" emerge-one for
agreements entered into for anticompetitive purposes, the other for agree-
ments with demonstrable anticompetitive effects. Each test has its pecu-
liar strengths and weaknesses and its peculiar function. Each contributes
something to the per se rules.
35. Standard 011, 221 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added); see American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 179.
36. 221 U.S. at58 (emphasis added).
37. 221 U.S. at 179.
38. See note 21 supra; see also R. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOX 36-37 (1978) (discussion of
Justice White's opinion in American Tobacco).
39. See text accompanying notes 93-175 & 196-209 infra.
40. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 622 (1953).
41. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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A. Rule of Reason: Purpose
In the context of conspiracy, "purpose" refers to the object or objects
consciously sought by the parties to the agreement. 42 In section 1 cases
the focus is on anticompetitive purpose-the purpose to cause anticom-
petitive effects.
Agreements entered into for anticompetitive purposes resemble tradi-
tional conspiracies, and in section 1 cases involving such agreements
many traditional conspiracy doctrines are held to apply. Thus, an agree-
ment may violate section 1 though no overt act has been committed in
furtherance of it,43 though it has failed of its anticompetitive purpose, 44
and though in retrospect it is clear that the parties never had the power to
achieve that purpose. 45 "It is the 'contract, combination . . . or conspir-
acy in restraint of trade or commerce' which § 1 of the Act strikes down,
whether the concerted activity be wholly nascent or abortive on the one
hand, or successful on the other." 46
42. In § I cases the courts generally use the terms "intent" and "intention" to mean "purpose"
as here defined. As the Supreme Court noted recently, "intent" has a broader significance in the
criminal law, encompassing "knowledge" as well as "purpose." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443-46 (1978). Since, after Gypsum, the distinction between knowl-
edge and purpose is material in criminal cases under § 1, the ambiguity in the term "intent" is likely
to prove troublesome in these cases.
Another term often used in the cases interchangeably with "purpose" is "motive." Some writers
on the mental aspects of the § I offense have defined "purpose" and "motive" to mean different
things. See, e.g., Bishop, Criminal Intent as Applied to Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act. I I VA.
L. REV. 417, 420-21 (1925); Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw.
U.L. REV. 705, 709-12 (1962). That seems to me a confusing departure from conventional usage in
the § I cases. What the cases call a "good motive" usually corresponds, under the definitions used
here, to a purpose to do something either neutral in the calculus of reasonable restraints on competi-
tion, or positive on the side of saving the agreement from condemnation. Note, for example, the
Supreme Court's classic dictum in Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20. 49
(1912), to the effect that the policies underlying § I cannot "be evaded by good motives." Usually.
by asserting a "good motive," the defendant is claiming either that it was not his purpose to injure
competition in any respect, or that he had at least one other relevant purpose as well.
43. The seminal decision is Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913). See Fiswick v.
United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 n.4 (1946); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.. 310 U.S.
150, 224 n.59 (1940); United States v. Flom, 558 F.2d 1179, 1183 (5th Cir. 1977): United States v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 213 F. Supp. 65, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1962); United States v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
9 F.R.D. 69,70 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
44. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100. 105 (1948). Another good example is United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 402-03 (1927), in which the Court approved an
instruction to the jury in substance that:
[I]f . .. the respondents did conspire to restrain trade as charged in the indictment, then it was
immaterial whether the agreements were ever actually carried out, whether the purpose of the
conspiracy was accomplished in whole or in part, or whether an effort was made to carry the
object of the conspiracy into effect.
45. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940); United States
v. Central States Theatre Corp., 187 F. Supp. 114, 147 (D. Neb. 1960).
46. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (quoting Sherman
Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)) (ellipsis in original).
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Under the law as it stood before 1911, a good case could be made that
section 1 condemned every agreement entered into for the purpose of res-
training competition in any way. 4 7 The 1911 Rule of Reason decisions
changed all that. After Standard Oil and American Tobacco, an agree-
ment with "direct and necessary" anticompetitive effects can be defended
under section 1 on the ground that it is not unreasonably restrictive of
competitive conditions-that on balance it does not suppress competi-
tion, but instead regulates and promotes it. Quite clearly, the dispensation
under the Rule of Reason is not confined to agreements from which the
anticompetitive effects result by accident. The Court has extended it to a
rule promulgated by a commodities exchange which had as its clear pur-
pose the elimination of bargaining over price in the sale of grain during
certain hours of the day48 and to resale restrictions imposed by a manufac-
turer on its agents or consignees for the purpose of reducing rivalry
among its retailers. 49 Within limits-and at the risk of later being found
to have violated those limits by "a jury of less competent men" 50-firms
may lawfully seek to reduce competition by agreement.
The question, then, is under what conditions anticompetitive purpose is
conclusive against the defendants on the issue of "restraint of trade." For
the answer, one must look first to the seminal Rule of Reason cases, Stan-
dard Oil and American Tobacco, in which the Court's decisions con-
demning the two great trusts turned on its findings concerning the pur-
poses for which they were formed.
From the evidence in the Rule of Reason cases it was apparently quite
plain that the defendants had monopolized their respective industries by
design. That in itself might have seemed to be enough to remove their
agreements from the class of contracts "entered into . . . with [a] legiti-
mate purpose, '"51 and place them squarely in the class of those "entered
into.., with the intent to do wrong to the general public." 52 The Court,
however, did not view the question of "reasonableness" in that way. In
each case, rather than rest the decision on the ground of deliberate mono-
47. In the early cases the Court struck down agreements on the simple stated ground that their
"direct and necessary effect" was to restrain trade. See text accompanying notes 103-107 infra. If,
as these decisions strongly implied, nothing could save an agreement with "direct and necessary"
anticompetitive effects, then, unless the Court was prepared (as it was not) to accept ineffectuality as
a defense, agreements whereby the parties sought to cause anticompetitive effects would have been
equally indefensible. Cf. United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal & Coke Co., 46 F. 432, 436
(C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1891)(defendants liable under § 1 on the strength of anticompetitive "purposes
and intentions," without more).
48. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
49. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381 (1967).
50. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376 (1913).
51. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58.
52. Id.
Washington Law Review
polization, the Chief Justice (writing for himself and seven other Justices)
pursued at great length a further, more elusive fact concerning the defen-
dants' state of mind. The facts in the oil case gave rise, the Court said, to
the "presumption of [an] intent and purpose to maintain the dominancy
over the oil industry . . . with the purpose of excluding others from the
trade." 53 The defendants were unable to rebut that presumption; indeed, it
was "made conclusive" by a careful consideration of the tactics by which
the defendants had secured their control. 54 The function of the presump-
tion, it appears, was to shift to the defendants the burden of clarifying for
the Court their ultimate purposes. Proof merely that they sought monop-
oly, though it raised a presumption of illegality, did not foreclose the pos-
sibility of a defense; the defendants were entitled to show, if they could,
that they had sought it for good reasons. From the opinions no criteria for
"good reasons" really emerge. In neither case were the proprietors of the
great trusts able to persuade the Court that they had had any end in view
more noble than to "drive others from the field and to exclude them from
their right to trade." 55 What clearly emerges from the opinions is the
Court's sense of its duty, before striking down agreements monopolistic
in both purpose and effect, to try to determine what the monopolists were
really trying to do.56
This proposition-that the true test of legality in a section 1 case is
what the parties were really trying to do-emerges only by painful impli-
cation from the long and difficult opinions of the Court in American To-
bacco and Standard Oil. The case most often cited for this proposition is
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 57 decided in 1898 by the
Sixth Circuit in an opinion written by Judge (later Chief Justice) William
Howard Taft. The record in Addyston Pipe disclosed an elaborate scheme
for raising prices by rigged bids, defended by the parties on the ground
that the only competition they sought to prevent was "ruinous competi-
tion." 58 The trial judge dismissed the bill and the Government appealed.
After a lengthy review of the authorities, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Rec-
ognizing that not all restraints were prohibited either at common law or by
the Sherman Act, 59 Judge Taft observed that one line of authority was
clear: "[N]o conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the
covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful
53. Id. at 75.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 76; see American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 181-83.
56. See R. BORK, supra note 38, at 37-38.
57. 85F. 271 (6th Cir 1898), aff d, 175 U.S. 211(1899).
58. Id. at 279.
59. Id. at 282.
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contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee ... ,,60 If the contract
had a lawful main purpose, its anticompetitive provisions were void if
they "exceed[ed] the necessity presented" by that purpose;61 if the con-
tract had no purpose other than to restrain competition, it was void alto-
gether. And since any contract or covenant void at common law as a re-
straint of trade fell, after 1890, within the prohibition of section 1 of the
Sherman Act if the trade it restrained was interstate, the agreement before
the court-a concerted attempt to suppress competition in sales to several
states with no lawful purpose whatsoever to redeem it-was in clear vio-
lation of the federal law. 62
Judge Taft's opinion in Addyston Pipe has had a distinguished career.
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 63 decided in the
same term as Standard Oil and American Tobacco, the Supreme Court
reversed its earlier position64 and expressly endorsed Judge Taft's reason-
ing. It has renewed that endorsement repeatedly since. 65 Commentators
have praised the opinion; 66 lower courts rely on it.67 On the whole, its
doctrines have proven far more serviceable than any others in defining the
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 278-79.
63. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
64. The privilege of writing the Court's opinion affirming the Sixth Circuit's decision in Addys-
ton Pipe fell to Justice Peckham. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
In his earlier opinion for the Court in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,
329 (1897), Justice Peckham had dismissed the "lawful main purpose" doctrine as irrelevant to the
Sherman Act. In his opinion in Addyston Pipe, he omitted any reference to Taft's main-purpose
rationale, resting the Court's affirmance instead on "the necessary effect of the combination." 175
U.S. at 235-38, 245.
65. E.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689, 696
(1978); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1940); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274
U.S. 445, 462 (1927); cf. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 622
(1953) (sustaining vertically imposed restraint on the ground that it was "predominantly motivated"
by "legitimate business aims"); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598
(1951) (affirming judgment for Government on findings that trademark licensing restrictions, reason-
able on their face, were "subsidiary and secondary to the central purpose of allocating trade terri-
tory").
66. One prominent enthusiast is Professor Robert Bork of Yale, former Solicitor General of the
United States and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust: "[G]iven the time at which it was written,
Addyston must rank as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust opinions in the history of the
law, . . . [It] may well have been the high-water mark of rational antitrust doctrine." R. BORK,
supra note 38, at 26, 30.
67. Among the more recent decisions are: Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057,
1082 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K.
Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977);
Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 1975); Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425
F.2d 932, 936 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 387 F. Supp. 252, 255-56 (D.N.J. 1975), aff d, 533 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied.
429 U.S. 860 (1976).
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class of those agreements unlawful under section 1 because (in the termi-
nology of Standard Oil) they have been "entered into ... with the intent
to do wrong to the general public. 68
The "lawful main purpose" doctrine reflects the common law's abiding
mistrust of agreements entered into for the purpose of stifling competi-
tion. When competition is stifled, the public is injured and, therefore,
unless the parties have misjudged their power in the market, their agree-
ment will surely do harm. The question is whether in a given case there is
a reasonable likelihood that it will do equivalent good. In the usual case
there is no such likelihood, as the parties are pursuing purely private gain
at the public's expense. In those few cases, however, in which the parties
to the agreement are pursuing a larger end-increased efficiency, or the
enhanced ability to compete-and are suppressing competition to that
end in a limited way, their interest in suppressing competition may coin-
cide with the public interest. To decide such cases, the doctrine shifts the
burden of evaluation from the court to the parties themselves. The con-
trolling question is whether the parties' lawful purpose was their main
one. No judge or juror deciding a case on main-purpose grounds need
worry that he or she has assumed "the power to say . . . how much re-
straint of competition is in the public interest, and how much is not": 69 the
balance is struck in the minds and hearts of the defendants. 70
Clearly this approach has much to be said for it. There is a healthy
simplicity to a rule that condemns, in every context under the Act and
without reservation, every agreement entered into primarily for anticom-
petitive purposes. Where there is no lawful main purpose-where the re-
straint has been imposed solely or primarily for anticompetitive purposes,
with "lawful" objectives secondary at best-the desirability of deterrence
is very great and the equities favoring the parties generally very slight. If
in a given case benefits flow to the public from such an agreement, it is
highly unlikely that the restraint chosen by the parties was really neces-
sary to their attainment. In the specific context of suits in equity, the rule
enables the court to frame a decree that will promote competition in
68. 221 U.S. at 58.
69. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), affd. 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
70. Sixteen years after his decision in Addyston Pipe-three years after Standard Oil and Anzer-
can Tobacco-Taft wrote:
No man who reads [the opinions in the decided cases under § I ] need be doubtful whether, when
he is making a business arrangement, he is violating the law or not. He can search his own
heart. . . [l~f what he is going to do is to reduce competition and gain control of the business
in any particular branch, if that is his main purpose and reduction of competition is not a mere
incidental result, if except for that purpose he would not go into the arrangement, then he must
know he is violating the law, and no sophistry, no pretense . .. need mislead him.
W. TAFT, THE ANTI-TRuST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 96 (1914).
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furtherance of the objectives of the Act without the expense, frustration,
and delay attendant on trial of the full range of the agreement's actual and
probable effects. 71
Appealing and functional though this doctrine is, problems arise in its
application which the opinions tend to gloss over. Several of these are
worth attention. None, I believe, represents a fundamental flaw.
First, there is the question of whose purposes control. The opinions
often refer to the purpose of the contract or the agreement. This usage is
appropriate for agreements like the one in Addyston Pipe, in which the
relevant purposes of all parties are the same. It is inappropriate in many
other kinds of cases that frequently arise, including, for example, the case
in which a manufacturer extracts an agreement from a distributor not to
resell the manufacturer's product below a certain price. The distributor
may or may not welcome the restriction. Though the distributor knows
what the effect of adherence will be, and may in fact intend to adhere,
unless termination of price competition is the conscious object of the dis-
tributor as well as the manufacturer, only the manufacturer can be said to
have entered into the agreement with that purpose. In such cases, both at
common law and under the Sherman Act, the courts have generally ig-
nored the dissenter, and concentrated on the purposes of the party who
insisted that the agreement include the anticompetitive term.72 In general
that seems entirely right. 73
Second, once it is established that an agreement was entered into by
parties seeking to restrain or injure competition, that agreement must be
held unlawful unless, at a minimum, those parties sought lawful objec-
tives as well. The criteria for "lawful objectives" or "legitimate purposes"
have never been entirely clear. At common law the permissible restraints
generally involved the transfer of information or ownership, or the inte-
gration of productive facilities, activities from which not only the parties
71. It might be argued that in fairness, and to prevent the court from interfering in conduct that
harms nobody, the defendants should be permitted to attempt to prove that their agreement cannot
possibly have the anticompetitive effects they hoped it would. In cases where the parties' purposes
are clear, this inquiry will greatly prolong the trial for the sake of a very doubtful improvement in the
soundness of the ultimate judgment. Moreover, there is something highly obnoxious-something
cynical-about a defense on the ground that the anticompetitive effects the defendants sought to
cause will never in fact materialize.
72. E.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1964); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958); Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v.
United States, 334 U.S. 110, 119 (1948); Santa Clara Valley Mill & Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal.
387, 18 P. 391 (1888); Amot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1877).
73. The fact that some parties acted with anticompetitive purposes and others did not may be
important on the issue of liability to sanctions for the violation. See text accompanying notes
260-287 infra.
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but the public might expect to gain. 74 It is unsettled how far beyond these
traditional categories the privilege to restrict competition by agreement
extends. From the premises of the doctrine it seems clear that the privi-
lege is confined to purposes the pursuit of which is likely to benefit the
public. The question is whether any and all claims of public benefit will
qualify-whether, for example, restraints are defensible on the ground
that their primary purpose was to promote public health, 75 safety, 76 or
morals, 77 deter and punish tortious conduct, 78 or promote affirmative ac-
tion against racial segregation. 79 The same questions arise under the other
branch of the Rule of Reason in connection with proof of beneficial ef-
fects. 80 One would hope and expect to find, as these questions are pressed
toward solution, that the classes of legitimating purposes and legitimating
effects coincide. But at this point even that much is conjecture.
If the defense of an agreement survives this step, the court must next
inquire into the "main purpose" of the agreement. On top of the usual
difficulties of assigning purposes to the acts of business entities, the "law-
ful main purpose" doctrine adds another: the pursuit of anticompetitive
and lawful purposes in the same agreement is permissible under section 1
only if the lawful purpose is the main one. Where good purposes are
pleaded in expiation of bad ones, it does seem important to ask what the
74. See generally Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373. 400-02
(1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-83 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
75. See. e.g., American Brands, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters. 308 F. Supp. 1166
(D.D.C. 1969) (preliminary injunction denied in suit attacking concerted refusal by broadcasters to
accept commercials for cigarettes high in tar and nicotine).
76. See, e.g., Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 400 U.S. 831
(1970) (upheld a manufacturer's termination of sales to an established dealer for the dealer's breach
of a convenant to confine resale of beauty products to professional beauticians, where the products
posed risks of skin irritation or blindness to consumers who used them improperly).
77. See, e.g., America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 328
(N.D. Ind. 1972) (newspapers' joint refusal to print X-rated movie advertisements sustained).
78. Cf. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycott for the purpose
of policing an industry against tortious copying of defendants' designs held to violate § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976)).
79. In 1977 the Baltimore Association of Minority Contractors sought a statement of the Justice
Department's enforcement intentions regarding proposed agreements with general contractors to give
minority-owned enterprises 10% of the subcontracting work on certain publicly financed projects.
Noting the conflict between two worthy objectives, the encouragement of participation by minority
contractors in the construction industry and open competition, the Department declined to state its
intentions. Justice Takes No Antitrust Position on Pact Awarding Subcontracts to Minority Firms,
832 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-6 (1977).
80. See text accompanying notes 142-157 infra. Professor John Coons has argued persuasively
that a conspiracy to promote wholly social objectives, without profit to the parties in any commercial
sense, would be beyond the prohibition of § 1. Coons, Noncommercial Purpose as a Sherman Act
Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 705 (1962). See also Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial
Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247.
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parties were really trying to do. The question is how far it is wise and just
to entrust that question to the intuitions of the trier of fact. Perhaps it is
generally true, as the doctrine seems to assume, that, when a firm enters
into an agreement hoping to accomplish several objectives, one of them is
more important to it than the rest. Unfortunately, there is no well estab-
lished technique in antitrust doctrine for sorting out this "main" or "pri-
mary" purpose from the others. 8'
Finally, to complete the defense of an agreement entered into for anti-
competitive purposes, the parties must show not only that they acted with
a lawful main purpose, but also that the restraint they sought to impose
did not exceed "the necessity presented" by that purpose. 82 In Addyston
Pipe, Judge Taft wrote confidently that "[tjhe main purpose of the con-
tract... furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity of
such restraints may be judicially determined. 83 He was spared the neces-
sity, however, of demonstrating his point, as the agreement before him
lacked any lawful main purpose at all. The determination is more difficult
than he implied. A restraint that inhibits competition in ways from which
even the parties themselves derive no benefit is, of course, unlawful, 84
but that is the only easy case. The test is not simply whether the restraint
benefits at least one of the parties, but whether it is "reasonable both with
respect to the public and to the parties"85-whether it is "no greater than
necessary to afford fair protection to the parties and not so extensive as to
interfere with the interests of the public."' 86 The restraint is unlawful un-
less it offers the party seeking it "fair" or "necessary" protection and no
more, bearing in mind the countervailing interest of the public in compe-
tition. 87 It is far from obvious how one draws that line, and courts that
have purported to draw it in applying the test of Addyston Pipe to sustain
81. Some cases are easier than others. Where it appears, for example, that the lawful purpose
claimed by the defendants as their main one could have been achieved by other means at less cost to
competition and no extra cost to the defendants, and that the defendants must have known of this, the
defense fails. See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), discussed in
text accompanying note 173 infra.
82. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
83. Id.
84. Cf. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (Ch. 1711) ("[W]hat does it signify to a
tradesman in London, what another does at Newcastle?").
85. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373,406 (1911).
86. Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 387 F. Supp. 252, 255 (D.N.J. 1975),
affd, 533 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 860 (1976).
87. See Homer v. Graves, 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (C.P. 1831), quoted with approval in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,282 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.), affd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899):
[W]e do not see how a better test can be applied to the question whether [this is a reasonable
restraint of trade] than by considering whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protec-
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agreements challenged under section 1 have seldom even tried to explain
what they have done. 88
Until the Supreme Court speaks to these questions, lower courts eval-
uating agreements under the "purpose" branch of the Rule of Reason will
have to continue to experiment with answers of their own. It is settled that
schemes to undermine competition may violate section 1 even when they
fail. It is equally settled that the Act must not be read to condemn every
agreement made for any anticompetitive purpose. The doctrine that
reconciles these principles, in cases not covered by a per se rule, is that an
agreement entered into for anticompetitive purposes violates section 1 un-
less the parties had a lawful main purpose as well and unless the restraint
imposed by their agreement was necessary to the accomplishment of that
lawful main purpose. Like most antitrust rules, the "lawful main purpose"
doctrine has the potential for good and for bad results, depending on how
it is applied. If administered carefully, it frees the courts to promote the
objectives of the Sherman Act in those cases where the Act's objectives
would be seriously frustrated if proof of anticompetitive effects were in-
variably required. 89
tion to the interests of the party in favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere
with the interests of the public. Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the
party . . is . . . unreasonable.
88. See. e.g., Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East. 542 F.2d 1053.
1061 (9th Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Winn Ave. Warehouse, Inc. v. Winchester
Tobacco Warehouse Co., 341 F.2d 287, 288 (6th Cir. 1965). The modem decisions applying the
common-law tests of *'fairness" and "'necessity" to employee covenants not to compete are dis-
cussed and analyzed in Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete. 73 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1960):
Goldschmid. Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with Restrictive Covenants
Under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1193 (1973); and Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Step-
child": Antitrust Treatment of Postenployment Restraints of Trade. 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621.
89. A body of doctrine is evolving in the lower courts to the effect that a private plaintiff cannot
prevail in a Rule of Reason case without proof that the defendant's agreement actually injured compe-
tition. See. e.g.. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ' 64,258. at 74.-
084-86 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 1981): Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286. 290-93 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied. 447 U.S. 924 (1980): Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.. 575 F.2d 564.
570-71 (5th Cir. 1978). cert. denied. 440 U.S. 909 (1979). Some of the opinions state flatly that no
showing of anticompetitive purpose will compensate in a Rule-of-Reason case for failure to prove
substantial anticompetitive impact. E.g., Northwest Power Prods. Inc. v. Omark Indus.. 576 F.2d
83. 90-91 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979). The opinions seldom reflect a strong
showing of anticompetitive purpose; sometimes the courts note expressly that the record discloses a
lawful primary purpose for the restraint. E.g.. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.. 1981-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 64,258, at 74,083 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 1981); Golden Gate Acceptance Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 597 F.2d 676, 678 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979). In a few cases, however, the doctrine has been
seriously applied. E.g.. Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp.. 625 F.2d 390, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1980) (revers-
ing a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that it was error to instruct the jury that the plaintiff
could recover without proof of actual public injury, if he could show that he was damaged by an
agreement entered into for the sole purpose of protecting distributors from competition).
Doubtless, to make out a restraint of trade under § 1, a private plaintiff must show more than unfair
conduct and injury to himself: the antitrust laws protect "competition. not competitors." Brown Shoe
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B. Rule ofReason: Effects
At common law, anticompetitive purpose was only one ground on
which agreements were denied enforcement as restraints of trade. Prior to
the enactment of the Sherman Act, contracts and covenants were fre-
quently held void as against public policy on the strength of their actual
and probable anticompetitive effects alone. Writing in 1880, in condemn-
ing an agreement among salt manufacturers which delegated the setting of
prices to a central committee, the Supreme Court of Ohio observed:
The clear tendency of such an agreement is to establish a monopoly, and
to destroy competition in trade, and for that reason, on grounds of public
policy, courts will not aid in its enforcement.... Courts will not stop to
inquire as to the degree of injury inflicted upon the public; it is enough to
know that the inevitable tendency of such contracts is injurious to the pub-
lic. 90
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). From the fact that § 1 does not make every business
tort a federal offense, it does not follow, however, that only those conspiracies that result in actual
injury to competition violate the law. Sound policy reasons exist for condemning at least some agree-
ments entered into solely or primarily for anticompetitive purposes whether or not they have done
quantifiable harm. See text accompanying note 71 supra. In civil and criminal cases alike, "[i]t is
the . . . conspiracy . . . which § 1 of the Act strikes down, whether the concerted activity be
wholly nascent or abortive on the one hand, or successful on the other." United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). See also McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S.
232, 243 (1980).
From the language in these recent opinions it seems clear that the courts mean to distinguish Rule
of Reason cases from cases in which the plaintiff invokes a per se rule. The reason for the distinction
is never explained. Given the logic of dispensing in particular cases with proof of anticompetitive
effects, the distinction is unsound. Compare, for example, two kindred practices-resale price main-
tenance and the imposition of territorial restrictions on resale. The former practice is still unlawful per
se, see California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); but
after Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the latter is not. A regime of
territorial restrictions imposed for the primary purpose of suppressing competition is hardly less
likely to do unjustifiable harm than a pattern of resale price maintenance agreements. If the seller
imposing either restraint has a small share of the market, the harm may well be insubstantial; if its
share is large, and it has the power often associated with large market share, the potential for unjusti-
fied harm in both cases is great. There is a strong public interest in deterring and enjoining both
schemes. In neither case is there good reason to put the party seeking relief to the difficult and cum-
bersome proof of actual market power and effect.
Significantly, perhaps, the cases in which the courts have imposed a requirement of actual market
power and effect tend almost without exception to be private treble-damage cases. To recover treble
damages, the plaintiff must prove "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent."
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat., Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). Such injury, the Court
has said, "should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts
made possible by the violation." Id. This is dictum, and may require qualification even in treble-
damage cases. It does suggest that what some courts have characterized as a substantive requirement
in Rule of Reason cases under § I may be, in fact, a general remedial requirement under § 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), applicable in private damage actions, but not in cases of other
kinds.
90. Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 672 (1880).
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Courts confronting agreements with clear and potent anticompetitive ten-
dencies often struck them down in terms that implied complete indiffer-
ence to the defendants' state of mind. 91 As a leading legal encyclopedia
of 1891 summarized the prevailing doctrine at common law: "Modern
adjudications have declared that all agreements tending to monopoly, or
restraint of trade, or that have for their primary intent the destruction of
competitive business and a consequent increase of price ... are injurious
to the commercial interests of the country, are contrary to public policy,
and, therefore void." 92
Consistently since 1897, 93 the Supreme Court in construing section 1
of the Sherman Act has adhered to that common-law tradition. Whatever
the proof may show concerning the parties' intentions, in a section 1 case
"[i]t is only if the conduct is not unlawful in its impact... that protection
is achieved."'94 Given proof of unreasonably anticompetitive effects,
proof of anticompetitive purpose is superfluous. Thus, an agreement may
be held to be in restraint of trade though it is impossible to determine from
the evidence what the parties were really trying to do. In section 1 cases
"it is sufficient that a restraint of trade ... results as the consequence of a
defendant's conduct or business arrangements"; to require a showing of
specific intent would "cripple the Act." 95
In view of the novelty of the notion of "conspiracy" without "unlawful
purpose," some documentation is warranted to show that these proposi-
tions as they appear in the cases are not sports. Six of the Court's opinions
on restraint of trade establish the doctrine's good credentials. In 1897, in
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,96 the Supreme
Court held that anticompetitive purpose is not an essential element of re-
straint of trade under section 1. It has never retreated from that holding.
In the 1911 Rule of Reason opinions-Standard Oil97 and American To-
91. E.g., People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834. 3 N.Y.S. 401
(1890); Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N.Y. 147 (1870); Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1851); Crawford & Murray v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190 (1868); Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay
Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871); Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467,469-70 (1866).
92. Annot.. 13 L.R.A. 770, 770 (1891) (emphasis added).
93. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
94. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967); cf. Standard Sanitary
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912):
[The policy of the Sherman Act cannot] be evaded by good motives. The law is its own measure
of right and wrong, of what it permits or forbids, and the judgment of the courts cannot be set up
against it in a supposed accommodation of its policy with the good intentions of the par-
ties . . ..
95. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
96. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
97. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911).
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bacco98-the Court carefully assimilated the Trans-Missouri holding into
the new doctrine. 99 In the Chicago Board of Trade v. United States opin-
ion of 1918100 the Court reformulated the Rule of Reason in terms that
almost wholly subordinated proof of purpose to proof of effects. The
Court's 1953 opinion in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States'01 restored the original balance between purpose and effect as alter-
native and independent grounds of liability. Most recently, in United
States v. Container Corp., 102 the Court held an agreement in violation of
section 1 on a record barren of any findings concerning anticompetitive
purpose; all nine Justices concurred in the proposition that an agreement
may properly be held to violate section 1 on the strength of its anticom-
petitive effects alone.
In the germinal case, Trans-Missouri, the Government appealed from
the dismissal of its bill charging eighteen railroad companies with "con-
triving and intending" to raise freight rates "and to counteract the effect of
free competition" by means of an agreement establishing a committee to
fix rates and make regulations that would bind them all. 103 The defen-
dants in their answer denied that in forming their association they had
acted with any of the purposes alleged in the bill. Because the Govern-
ment chose to bring the case before the Supreme Court "on bill and an-
swer," the Court was required to assume the truth of those denials. 104
Thus, if the allegations in the bill concerning intent were'essential to the
Government's claim, the Court had no choice but to affirm the dismissal
of the suit. Given the peculiar procedural posture of the case, the Court
could rule for the Government only if it was prepared to hold that the
circumstances made it unnecessary to reach the question of purpose at
all. 105 The Court so held. In light of the terms of the agreement the defen-
dants admitted having made, proof as to their intent was not required:
since restraint of trade was the "direct, immediate, and necessary effect"
of the agreement, the agreement was unlawful under section 1 "without
proof of the allegation that the agreement was entered into for the purpose
of restraining trade or commerce."1 06
The sweeping condemnation in Trans-Missouri of all agreements with
98. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
99. See text accompanying notes 108 & 109 infra.
100. 246U.S. 231 (1918).
101. 345 U.S. 594(1953).
102. 393 U.S. 333(1969).
103. 166U.S. at299.
104. Id. at 341.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 342.
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"direct, immediate, and necessary" ill effects on competition in interstate
commerce proved unsatisfactory as a general standard for liability under
section 1. In a subsequent opinion applying the Trans-Missouri doctrine,
the Court noted that in order to avoid stifling ordinary trade the Act would
have to be given a "reasonable construction." ' 107 Finally, in Standard Oil
and American Tobacco a majority of the Court led by Chief Justice White
succeeded in establishing the Rule of Reason as the dominant test under
section 1 for restraint of trade.
If the Court in these cases had formulated the Rule of Reason in terms
that made anticompetitive purpose an indispensable element, Trans-Mis-
souri would have been effectively overruled. Instead, the Court chose a
disjunctive formulation: arrangements might be "unreasonably restrictive
of competitive conditions, either from the nature or character of the con-
tract or act or [where the facts] give rise to the inference or presumption
that they had been entered into or done with the intent to do wrong to the
general public."' 108 In the Standard Oil opinion, the Chief Justice took
some care to accommodate the Court's holdings to the holdings of the
earlier decisions. While perhaps a few things in Trans-Missouri had been
carelessly stated, the decision was right: the agreement in that case was
illegal under section 1 by virtue of its "necessary effect and the character
of the parties by whom [it was] made."' 109 Thus, under the Rule of Rea-
son, an agreement might stand condemned without findings of anticom-
petitive purpose, on a proper showing of anticompetitive effect. Beyond
endorsing the result in Trans-Missouri, the Court did not indicate what
showing of anticompetitive effect would suffice. Rather, it rested its con-
demnation of the agreements in the cases before it on proof in the record
of malevolent intent. 110
Seven years after Standard Oil and American Tobacco, the Court de-
cided Chicago Board.1 1 The formulation of the Rule of Reason most
widely quoted today is Justice Brandeis' formulation for the Court in that
case. "The true test of legality," Brandeis wrote, "is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion." 1 12 In making this determination, a court must consider not only the
107. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898). Cf. Cincinnati. Portsmouth.
Big Sandy, & Pomeroy Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179, 185 (1906). Four Justices had dissented
from the Court's decision in Trans-Missouri on that same ground. 166 U.S. at 344.
108. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added): see American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 179.
109. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 65.
110. See text accompanying notes 51-56 supra.
111. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
112. Id. at 238.
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"nature of the restraint, and its effect, actual or probable," but also "[t]he
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, [and] the purpose or end sought to be attained." 113
As to this last group of considerations, the Justice added a clarification:
"This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation, or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences."' 114 Applying this
analysis to the after-hours trading rule before the Court, the Court held
unanimously for the defendants.
On the point important here-the controlling significance of effects in
a section 1 case-Chicago Board and the 1911 decisions are in full ac-
cord. 115 An agreement may violate section 1 if, as a result of it, competi-
tion is suppressed or destroyed, regardless of the purposes for which it
was made. Proof of good and bad intentions is relevant insofar as it helps
the court determine what effects the agreement has had or will have. At
this point, however, its significance ends; once an agreement is found to
be objectionable in its consequences, the best of intentions will not save
it.
The Supreme Court's Rule of Reason opinions after 1917 elaborate on
the basic themes of Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and Chicago
Board. One in particular-Justice Clark's opinion for the Court in Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States' 16-is important here for its
explicit recognition that the seminal cases require not one evaluation of a
restraint for "reasonableness," but two.
At issue in Times-Picayune was the defendant publishing company's
so-called "unit plan"--its practice of requiring merchants who wished to
advertise in its morning paper to buy an ad in its afternoon paper as well.
The Government sued to enjoin the practice as a tying arrangement un-
lawful per se under section 1. The Court stated that, while the unit plan
was not unlawful per se, this did not end the inquiry: the publisher's con-
tracts must also "be tested under the Sherman Act's general prohibition
on unreasonable restraints of trade."" 7 Since the defendant's unit-plan
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Without citing or quoting directly from Standard Oil or American Tobacco, Brandeis took
the elements of Chief Justice White's formulations ("nature," "effect," "intent") and recombined
them in a way that undermined White's rationale for the actual decisions in the earlier cases. For
White, the key to Standard Oil and American Tobacco had been the nefarious intent of the defen-
dants. Under Brandeis' formulation, the sole office of evidence as to intent is to help a court predict
the consequences of an agreement or regulation; in the final evaluation of the agreement as to its
reasonableness, intent plays no part.
116. 345 U.S. 594(1953).
117. Id.at614.
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contracts were "banned by § 1 if unreasonable restraint was either their
object or effect,"' 18 the test would have to be conducted under two sepa-
rate heads. The Court examined the record, first, for indications of unrea-
sonably anticompetitive effects, and then, because "even otherwise rea-
sonable trade arrangements must fall if conceived to achieve forbidden
ends," for indications that the agreements had been "predominantly moti-
vated" by other than "legitimate business aims."' 19 Concluding that the
Government had failed to prove either case, the Court upheld the unit
plan. The significance of the opinion lies in its structure, which exempli-
fies perfectly the teaching of Standard Oil and American Tobacco: agree-
ments may violate section 1 "either because of their ... effect or because
of [their] evident purpose.' ' 120
The last case in the series shows that all this is more than mere talk. In
1969, in United States v. Container Corp. of America, 121 the Court struck
down an agreement among competitors on the strength of its adverse ef-
fects on price competition, without suggesting in any way that the court
below had erred in finding the parties innocent of any purpose to cause
those effects.
The heart of the Government's section 1 case against the corporate de-
fendants in Container Corp. was their practice of informing one another,
on request, of prices most recently quoted and charged for standardized
corrugated containers. After trial without a jury, the district judge found
that the Government had failed to prove that the defendants had entered
into an agreement for any purpose, that their purpose in exchanging price
information had been to injure competition, or that their exchange had
had that effect. Accordingly, he dismissed the complaint. 122 The Su-
preme Court reversed. The defendants' tacit understanding that any one
of them would supply the others on request with information as to the
prices he was currently charging and quoting to specific customers was
held sufficient to establish a combination or conspiracy under section
1.123 From the record, "[t]he inferences [were] irresistible that the ex-
change of price information . . . had an anticompetitive effect in the in-
dustry, chilling the vigor of price competition."'' 24 That was sufficient to
establish restraint of trade. 125 Without the benefit of any finding that the
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id.at622.
120. American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 179.
121. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
122. 273 F. Supp. 18 (M.D.N.C. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
123. 393 U.S. at 335.
124. Id.at337.
125. Id. at 338.
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parties had acted with a purpose to inhibit price competition-without
disturbing the lower court's finding that they had not-the Court held that
the defendants had combined and conspired in violation of section 1.126
The Court's decision in Container Corp. stands squarely in the tradi-
tion established in 1897 by Trans-Missouri, perpetuated in Standard Oil,
American Tobacco, Chicago Board, and Times-Picayune. The defen-
dants were held to have violated section 1 "without proof ... that [their]
agreement was entered into for the purpose of restraining trade or com-
merce" 127 because of the agreement's demonstrable anticompetitive ef-
fects. 128 Their agreement suppressed competition and did not promote it.
Under the "effects" branch of the Rule of Reason, the proof was com-
plete.
Looking behind and beyond this line of Supreme Court decisions, it is
appropriate to ask whether the doctrine that proof of anticompetitive pur-
pose is dispensable in a section 1 case serves the purposes of the Sherman
Act. I think that it does, and does so particularly well in the kinds of cases
that have produced the Rule-that is, in civil suits under section 1 for
injunctive relief.
The aim of the Sherman Act is to preserve for the public the benefits of
competition. Many agreements that on the whole are injurious to compe-
tition are entered into under circumstances that make anticompetitive pur-
pose difficult or impossible to prove. To require that a bad purpose be
proven in every suit for an injunction under section 1 would place beyond
the reach of the law agreements that as a matter of reason and policy fall
squarely within it, and ought to be enjoined.
This argument seems to me quite persuasive. It must be defended
against attack on four main grounds: (1) evidence of anticompetitive ef-
fect is unreliable unless supported by proof of anticompetitive purpose;
(2) reasonably and unreasonably anticompetitive agreements cannot be
distinguished on the basis of effects alone; (3) condemnation of wholly
well-motivated agreements will deter businessmen from launching proj-
ects from which the public would benefit; and (4) condemnation of such
agreements will work undue hardship.
126. Justice Fortas, concurring, stressed that he did not understand the Court to hold that ex-
changes of price information among competitors were illegal per se; the defendants' agreement vio-
lated § I only because it "did in fact substantially limit the amount of price competition in the indus-
try." 393 U.S. at 340. Justice Marshall, joined by two others, dissented. He would not, he wrote,
condemn such an agreement under § 1 without more proof "that it was entered into for the purpose of
restraining price competition or that it actually had that effect." Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
127. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 342.
128. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980); United States v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446 n.22 (1978) ("[O]ur decision in . . .Container Corp. . . . is fairly
read as indicating that proof of an anticompetitive effect is a sufficient predicate for liability").
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Determining how an agreement will affect competition is a difficult
business, and the judge who welcomes the task is rare. Justice Frank-
furter, for one, made it clear that he wanted no part of it:
[T]o demand . . . evidence as to what would have happened but for the
adoption of the practice that was in fact adopted or to require firm prediction
of an increase of competition as a probable result of ordering the abandon-
ment of the practice, would be a standard of proof, if not virtually impossi-
ble to meet, at least most ill-suited for ascertainment by courts. 129
Unless the parties agree to do something sufficiently pernicious to qualify
for per se treatment, their purpose is arguably the only reliable guide to
the agreement's effects. When the record shows that the parties sought to
injure competition in a certain way and that they had the power to do it, a
court is justified in ascribing those results to the agreement. Absent such
proof, the courts are so unlikely to estimate the good and bad economic
effects of agreements correctly that it must be assumed that Congress did
not intend for them to try.
Such reasoning might fairly persuade a judge in honest doubt in a par-
ticular case to stay his or her hand. It will not support a fixed and uniform
policy of requiring proof of bad purpose in every section 1 suit. Common
experience and basic propositions of economics teach that certain kinds of
agreements normally have certain kinds of anticompetitive effects. In any
given case involving such an agreement it is right to shift the burden of
proof to the party who denies that such effects will follow, and if that
party fails to produce persuasive evidence that they will not, to find that
they will. In evaluating such evidence, and in making more complex
judgments, expert assistance is available to the court. Sometimes con-
flicts in the expert testimony will sorely trouble the trier of fact, but that
problem is scarcely peculiar to antitrust. It surely does not justify quitting
the field.
One might concede that it is possible in many cases to identify anti-
competitive consequences by proof of something other than the parties'
purposes, and still deny that an agreement can be evaluated in any princi-
pled way by reference to effects alone. "[E]conomics," Professors Dirlam
and Kahn have written persuasively,
offers no objective measure of the vitality of competition, in all its aspects,
or any way of balancing its possible attenuation in certain respects or in
certain markets-where the advantages, tactics, or consequences of market
power may have taken the toll of existing firms, discouraged the entry of




others, or softened the price rivalry among those that remain-against its
intensification, by the same firms and similar market practices, in other mar-
kets or in other respects. 130
From this one might, perhaps, conclude that there is no way in most cases
to differentiate reasonable from unreasonable restraints of trade except by
reference to the parties' purposes:
How does one decide when to exonerate, when to condemn . . .?
The inescapable conclusion is that, from a practical standpoint, the crite-
rion of intent alone "fills the bill" for a sensible antitrust policy in [most]
cases.... What was the purpose of the list which may have made it black?
Was the lower price offered in good faith to meet competition? Why did one
firm buy out another? .. .
The point is... simply to find out what they were doing. 131
This carries a valuable insight to an extreme conclusion. Of the three
ways in which agreements have been held to fail the "effects" test under
section 1, two do not depend at all on the kind of judgment that econom-
ics is powerless to make. First, agreements with anticompetitive effects
are held to violate section 1 when there are no offsetting procompetitive
effects whatsoever. 132 While that determination is sometimes hard to
make on a sketchy factual record, there is nothing logically peculiar about
it. Second, when an agreement has anticompetitive and procompetitive
effects, the doctrine has it that the agreement is unreasonably anticompet-
itive if a means exists by which the bad effects can be mitigated without
substantially jeopardizing the good ones. 133 Again, the problems of judg-
ment stem from limits on the court's resources for factfinding and predic-
tion rather than from anything unusual about the criterion for judgment.
Courts of equity are frequently called on to make that kind of assessment,
tailoring their decrees to the circumstances of the case so as to sacrifice
only so much of one party's interests as is necessary to protect the other
party and the public. 134
Surely there is, however, something troublesome about the third kind
of judgment courts are called on to make under the effects branch of the
analysis. An agreement with procompetitive effects that cannot be
achieved by less anticompetitive means is lawful, under the decisions of
the Supreme Court, only if its "net effect is to preserve and not to damage
130. J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAiR COMPETITION 48 (1954).
131. Id. at 51-52 (emphasis added).
132. See text accompanying notes 143-152 infra.
133. See text accompanying notes 169-175 infra.
134. See generally W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQurry § 25 (2d ed. 1956).
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competition. " 135 On the present state of the theory, something must be
conceded to those who question the ability of courts in section I cases to
make this determination in a lawlike way. Economics furnishes no tech-
nique for balancing the anticompetitive against the procompetitive effects
of an agreement; the Supreme Court has yet to identify the discipline that
will.
If courts are permitted in section 1 cases to enjoin the implementation
of agreements without proof that the parties consciously sought to injure
competition, clearly some agreements will be enjoined that should be,
and could not be otherwise. Perhaps some agreements will be enjoined
that should not be. The question is whether, in view of the alternatives,
that risk is worth bearing. A rule that required proof of anticompetitive
purpose in every section 1 case would confine the Act's operation to those
agreements where the parties foresaw that competition would be injured
and consciously desired to injure it, and where their bad purposes are
provable at trial. Excluded from the operation of the Act would be all
agreements with anticompetitive effects overlooked by the parties in their
planning; all with anticompetitive effects the parties foresaw, but did not
desire to cause; and all with anticompetitive effects carefully planned for
by parties who had the wit and skill to disguise their objectives. Given the
fact that anticompetitive effects are often reasonably ascertainable with-
out proof of anticompetitive purpose, the ease with which evidence of
good purposes can be fabricated, and the caution with which courts custo-
marily proceed in enjoining projects that appear to have been undertaken
in good faith, a rule dispensing with a requirement of proof of anticom-
petitive purpose in section 1 suits seems likely to condemn a great many
bad agreements, and very few good ones.
From the standpoint of a case-by-case evaluation of agreements on the
merits in suits in equity under section 1, it seems fairly clear that a re-
quirement of proof of anticompetitive purpose would significantly ob-
struct the purposes of the law. Eliminating such a requirement may deter
the formation of some socially desirable agreements. Surely, it has a con-
structive deterrent effect as well. Entrepreneurs who know that lack of an
improper purpose is not a complete defense will be more likely to look for
ways to reduce or eliminate the anticompetitive effects of their projects.
At least in the context of suits in equity under section 1, there is no good
reason to suppose that dispensing with a fixed requirement of anticompet-
itive purpose will discourage more good projects than bad ones. ' 36
135. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967): see text accompanying
notes 158-168 infra.
136. The risk of over-deterrence increases when the more awesome Sherman Act sanctions-
treble damages and criminal penalties-are imposed without proof of anticompetitive purpose. See
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That leaves the equities. Agreements often do involve changes of posi-
tion-commitments costly to abandon, good opportunities passed up. In-
junctions issued on proof of anticompetitive effects alone may impose
real hardship on well-motivated people who could not reasonably have
foreseen those effects or who honestly overlooked the less restrictive al-
ternatives available.
This concern can be and is accommodated in suits in equity under sec-
tion 1, not by requiring anticompetitive purpose as an indispensable ele-
ment of every violation, but by adhering to the general principles which
govern courts in granting equitable relief. 137 Traditionally in equity, the
defendant's innocent state of mind, even when it is immaterial on the
issue of whether or not a legal duty was breached, may properly be con-
sidered in the determination of the appropriate remedy. 138 In general, in
suits in equity under section 1, acts done in deliberate disregard of the law
are held to "call for repression by sterner measures" than acts undertaken
in the reasonable belief that no substantial harm would result. 139 In deter-
mining the appropriate equitable remedy for a section 1 violation, the
judge must look primarily to the interest of the public. The decree must be
framed so as "to compel action by the conspirators that will, so far as
practicable, cure the ill effects of the illegal conduct, and assure the pub-
lic freedom from its continuance. ' 140 But there will always be choices to
be made concerning degrees of severity, based on the apparent extent of
the parties' culpability.
Whatever its costs, the doctrine that under section 1 "[i]t is sufficient
[for liability] that a restraint of trade . . results as the consequence of a
defendant's conduct or business arrangements"'141 is indispensable to the
fulfillment of the basic purposes of the law. Under the "effects" branch of
the Rule of Reason, unfortunately, there is no single opinion comparable
to Judge Taft's in Addyston Pipe-no authoritative statement of all of the
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440-42 (1978). The Court has held,
nevertheless, that even in criminal cases under § 1 an anticompetitive purpose requirement would be
"unduly burdensome." Id. at 446; see text accompanying notes 260-277 infra.
137. See De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1945).
138. See generally Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 TEx. L. REv. 412
(1940).
139. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 89-90 (1940). Compare United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 183, 186 (1944) (harsh decree entered against
defendants who sought to "crush" competition and succeeded--"[t]he pattern of past conduct is not
easily forsaken") with United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (defendant held entitled to consideration, in framing
decree, of the fact that its officers had acted in reliance on reasonable interpretations of decisions of
the Supreme Court).
140. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 88 (1940).
141. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105,(1948).
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steps in the analysis. From the cases decided under this branch of the rule,
however, a procedure for decision does emerge. First, it seems reason-
ably clear that any agreement with actual or probable anticompetitive ef-
fects violates section 1 unless it has actual or probable procompetitive
effects as well. Second, when effects of both kinds are found to be pre-
sent, the agreement is unlawful under section 1 if on balance its net effect
on competition is adverse. Finally, if an agreement passes this test it is
lawful, unless its beneficial effects on competition could reasonably have
been achieved at less cost to competition-unless, in other words, the
defendants had reasonably available to them a less restrictive alternative.
While it has been well understood that good effects may properly be
urged on a court in a Rule of Reason case, there has been no clear under-
standing as to the kinds of effects that make out a section 1 defense. Some
lower courts have seemed to believe that if a restraint could be shown to
have had any effects that were useful to the parties and not wholly perni-
cious, the anticompetitive effects of the restraint were automatically
excused.1 42 For a long time, no Supreme Court decision clearly held to
the contrary.
The question of redeeming virtues in section 1 cases has now been sig-
nificantly clarified by the Supreme Court's decision in National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States. 143 In that case the National Soci-
ety appeared before the Court to defend a bylaw provision forbidding any
member to quote a firm price to a client until the client had selected him
for the project, subject to the negotiation of a satisfactory contract. It con-
tended that price competition among consulting engineers jeopardizes the
safety of the public by promoting slipshod engineering, and appealed to
the Court to reverse the decree rendered below for the Government with-
out findings as to primary purpose or probable beneficial effect. The
Court affirmed on the merits. "Contrary to its name," Justice Stevens
wrote for the majority, the Rule of Reason "does not open the field of
antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that
may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the
142. E.g., American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.. 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975). A
franchisee sued the nation's largest hotel chain over certain restrictive clauses in the franchise con-
tract, including a clause that forbade franchisees to operate motels other than Holiday Inns anywhere
in the country without prior approval by the franchisor. Defendant contended that its "Holidex Sys-
tem"-a computerized reservation referral network connecting the 1380 Holiday Inns-had been
"very important" to its "growth and success." id. at 1237. and that the contract clause in question
was necessary to ensure that a guest at one Holiday Inn would be booked into another Holiday Inn the
following night. Held, judgment for plaintiff reversed and case remanded for further consideration of
whether the clause was "fairly necessary" to "'preserve the viability" of the Holidex system. Id. at
1238. 1248.
143. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions."'144 The sole test
under the Rule of Reason is "whether the challenged agreement is one
that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition. ' 145 The
defendant's bylaw did suppress competition: It "operate[d] as an absolute
ban on competitive bidding" and "impede[d] the ordinary give and take of
the market place."' 146 Whether it had the virtues claimed for it or not was
immaterial, because those virtues were not the kind that could properly be
urged on a court under section 1. The defendant had chosen to rest its
case, not on the proposition that preservation of the public safety pro-
motes competition in some way, but on "the potential threat that competi-
tion poses to the public safety."'147 Its argument, reduced to its essentials,
was that "competition itself is unreasonable."148 That, however sensible it
might sound to the defendant, was contrary to the basic policy of the
Sherman Act. 149 Since that was all the engineers had to say for their anti-
competitive bylaw, there was no issue to try.
In Professional Engineers the Supreme Court confirmed what it had
implied in a number of Rule of Reason cases 150 after Chicago Board, but
never squarely held: Absent proof of "procompetitive" effects, an agree-
ment with demonstrable anticompetitive effects violates section 1.151 To
hold otherwise, Justice Stevens observed, would commit the courts to sail
endlessly on the "'sea of doubt"' Judge Taft warned of long ago, "which
this Court has firmly avoided ever since."'1 52
The opinion in Professional Engineers defines the terms in which the
defense of an agreement with anticompetitive effects must be conducted
in a section 1 case. There have been and will continue to be arguments
over the kinds of effects that can fairly be called "procompetitive," stem-
144. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 691.
146. Id. at692.
147. Id. at 695.
148. Id. at 696.
149. Indeed, it was a "frontal assault" on that policy. Id. at 695.
150. E.g., United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 118 (1975); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253,263 (1963).
151. Justice Brandeis' formulation in Chicago Board-"[t]he true test of legality is whether the
restraint . . . merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition'--implied that a re-
straint that regulated competition might be reasonable even if it did not promote it. 246 U.S. at 238.
See R. BORK, supra note 38, at 41-47 (1978). Justice Stevens' reformulation in Professional Engi-
neers implies the contrary, and from the context it is clear that the reformulation was deliberate, see
text accompanying note 145 supra.
152. 435 U.S. at 696 (quoting United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th
Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
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ming from different conceptions of the ultimate purposes of the Act. 153
Two categories of procompetitive effects eligible for consideration in a
Rule of Reason case are already clearly identified in the decisions of the
Court: the intensification of interbrand competition through the revival of
a declining firm, 154 and the channeling of transactions into markets that
operate in close approximation to the competitive ideal. 155 Clearly these
do not exhaust the possibilities. Those who view competition as an instru-
ment rather than an end in itself argue that agreements that have the effect
of promoting certain ends must be held to be defensible under section 1,
even when they significantly reduce the intensity of "competition" in the
ordinary sense.156 In recent decisions the Court has moved toward the
adoption of that approach by suggesting that agreements with anticompet-
itive effects may be defended under section 1 on the ground that they
"increase economic efficiency."' 157 It remains to be seen what the Court
means by "economic efficiency," and how far it is prepared to permit
firms to go in sacrificing rivalry to that end.
Once an agreement is shown to have procompetitive as well as anti-
competitive effects, the issue under the Rule of Reason is fairly joined.
Now, in the words of Chief Justice White, "judgment must... be called
into play."' 158
At this critical point the opinions of the Supreme Court give no clear
guidance as to the procedure for decision. They offer various interesting
formulations of the question. Is the agreement one which, in light of "all
of the circumstances . . . should be prohibited as imposing an unreason-
able restraint on competition"? 59 Is its "net effect ... to preserve and not
153. Compare R. BORK, supra note 38, at 50-89 (1978), Bork & Bowman. The Crisis in Anti-
trust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965) and Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191
(1977) with C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 11-22, 44-99 (1959). Blake & Jones, In
Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1965) and Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic
Disciplines, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977). See generally Bernhard, Divergent Concepts of Com-
petition in Antitrust Cases, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 43 (1970).
154. Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977): United States v. Ar-
nold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
155. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Cf. Maple Flooring Mfrs.'
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 584 (1925) (firm's use of trade association's statistics on
production and market prices, although it may result in "stabiliz[ing] prices or limit[ing] production
through a better understanding of economic laws and a more general ability to conform to them."
does not violate Act). See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, § 106.
156. " 'Competition,' for purposes of antitrust analysis, must be understood as a term of art
signifying any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by judicial decree." R.
BORK, supra note 38, at 51 (1978).
157. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,441 n. 16 (1978).
158. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at63.
159. Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
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to damage competition"? 160 They do not suggest a method for arriving at
a principled answer.
At one point the Court seemed on the verge of giving up. In 1965, in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 161 the Court held part of the
defendant's system of vertical restrictions on intrabrand competition rea-
sonable under section 1 on the ground that "it was justified by, and went
no further than required by, [interbrand] competitive pressures; and...
its net effect [was] to preserve and not to damage competition in the bicy-
cle market."'1 62 Seven years later, in United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc., 163 a majority of the Court joined with Justice Marshall in an opinion
in which he argued forcefully that courts are hopelessly illsuited to make
judgments of that kind:
Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition
in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another
sector is one important reason we have formulated per se rules.
To analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing inter-
ests and the endless data that would surely be brought to bear on such deci-
sions, and to make the delicate judgment on the relative values to society of
competitive areas of the economy, the judgment of the elected representa-
tives of the people is required. 164
After 1972, however, something happened to restore the Court's confi-
dence. In 1977 Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 165 dismissed with a wave the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the only alternatives open to the Court in the case were blanket
approval of the practice involved or a rule of per se illegality, stating that
the plaintiff's "contention that balancing intrabrand and interbrand com-
petitive effects of vertical restrictions is not a 'proper part of the judicial
function,' . . . is refuted by Schwinn."'166 The Court did not strike the
balance, however; instead, it remanded the case to the District Court to
weigh "all of the circumstances."1 67
The short of it is that we do not have, under the effects branch of the
Rule of Reason, any test comparable to the "lawful main purpose" test of
Addyston Pipe. On the present state of the authority, as one respected
160. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967).
161. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
162. Id. at 382.
163. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
164. Id. at 609-10, 611-12.
165. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
166. Id. at 57 n.27 (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)).
167. Id. at 49, 59.
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commentator has written, the evaluation of an agreement under section 1
"must be referred to the arts rather than the sciences of judg-
ment. . . . [O]ne must call forth his best and most purposeful intui-
tion." ' 168 If this seems unsatisfactory, it is far from obvious what to do
about it.
In some cases the court is rescued from these difficulties by the final
step of the analysis. Granted the basic premise of the Rule of Reason that
restraints on competition must be tolerated when they yield compensating
public benefits of certain types, it seems clear that the public interest lies
in securing such benefits at the least possible sacrifice. A restraint that
confers certain benefits at the cost of unnecessary injury to competition
can fairly be said to be, to the extent of that unnecessary injury, "unrea-
sonable." And so the courts have held in a series of cases denying a de-
fense under section 1 when parties have bypassed available "less restric-
tive alternatives. ''169
Once again, there is no single authoritative statement of the doctrine.
Its operation may be illustrated by examples from two decisions of the
Supreme Court, Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States,70
and Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States.171 In Standard Sanitary the
Court affirmed a judgment for the Government against a patentee and its
licensees who had conspired to fix the terms on which they would sell
products made by the patented process. The defendants contended their
conspiracy would result in more widespread use of the process, which in
turn would reduce the amount of defective enameled ironware on the mar-
ket and create a more humane working environment for the enamelers.
The Court was unimpressed. Since "all of the substantial good which is
asserted to have been the object of the agreements" could have been ob-
tained from licensing without the restraints, 17 2 the justification failed. In
168. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21. § 68, at 188.
169. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271 (1963) (Brennan, J.. concurring).
See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1947); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States, 309 U.S. 436,459-60 (1940); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S.
20, 42 (1912); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v.
National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620-22 (8th Cir. 1976). cert. dismissed. 434 U.S. 801
(1977); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1975): Kapp v.
National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part & appeal dismissed in
part as moot, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). Other cases are cited
in note 209 infra. Cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365. 382 (1967) (restraint
that "was justified by, and went no further than required by, competitive pressures" upheld as rea-
sonable); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 138-40 (1936) (doctrine applied in case de-
cided under § 3 of the Clayton Act).
170. 226U.S.20(1912).
171. 309U.S. 436(1940).
172. 226 U.S. at 42.
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the Ethyl case the defendant, the leading manufacturer of a patented fluid
used by refiners to increase the lead content of gasoline, required its cus-
tomers to confine their sales of leaded gas to jobbers selected by the de-
fendant. The defendant appealed the issuance of an injunction against this
practice on the ground, among others, that restrictions were necessary to
protect the public against the health risks of careless handling of leaded
fuel by irresponsible jobbers. The Court affirmed the decree: "The avoid-
ance of such dangers as there may be . . . would seem . . . to be
amply secured [by] requiring the purchasers . . . to take proper health
precautions including the posting of notices which appellant sup-
plies . . "173
In these and other similar cases, the courts have refused to recognize
compensating benefits as a justification for anticompetitive effects, be-
cause the same fine results could reasonably have been accomplished in a
less anticompetitive way. In a Rule of Reason case "the problem is not
simply whether some justification can be found, but whether the restraint
so justified is more restrictive than necessary, or excessively anticompeti-
tive, when viewed in the light of extenuating interests." ' 174 To date the
implications of this doctrine have not been fully explored in the decisions.
It is not clear, for example, whether the less restrictive alternative that
defeats a section 1 defense must be one that the parties, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered themselves. 175
The doctrine of "less restrictive alternatives," which has evolved in
cases in which agreements have been held to violate section 1 because of
their effects, is obviously closely related to the condition of "reasonable
necessity" attached under the other branch of the Rule of Reason to the
privilege to restrain competition for a lawful main purpose. 176 Both doc-
trines aim to minimize the adverse effects of an agreement on competi-
173. 309 U.S. at460.
174. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,270 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
175. The question is considered in American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d
1230, 1248-50 (3d Cir. 1975). If the "less restrictive alternative" need not be one that the parties
should reasonably have discovered themselves, businessmen who have pursued a lawful main pur-
pose in a responsible way are potentially liable to severe sanctions without fault. If, on the other
hand, reasonable diligence is a complete defense, the courts will be powerless to enjoin needlessly
anticompetitive activity even once its needlessness is proven to all.
Other questions might be raised. For example, must the private costs of the "less restrictive alter-
native" be less than or equal to the private costs of the alternative chosen by the parties? Suppose, for
example, that in a given case all the benefits resulting to the public from a flat ban on sales by
distributors outside their vertically imposed exclusive territories could have been achieved without
deterring all competition among distributors-by means, for example, of a requirement that any
distributor selling in another's territory pass through a portion of its profits on these sales to the other.
What is the relevance, if any, of the fact that the flat ban is cheaper to administer?
176. See text accompanying notes 82-88 supra.
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tion, subject to some constraint. On the "purpose" side, the constraint is
the accomplishment of a lawful main purpose; on the "effects" side, it is
the promotion of competition in some form other than the form re-
strained.
This observation suggests a broader conclusion. Notwithstanding the
separate character of the two branches of the Rule of Reason, and the
sound reasons for holding that restraint of trade may be established by
proof either of anticompetitive purpose or of anticompetitive effect, there
are points at which the two branches of the Rule of Reason must con-
verge. It would seem absurd to classify a purpose to cause certain effects
as a lawful main purpose, unless under the other branch of the doctrine
effects of that kind are held to redeem anticompetitive effects when they
occur. Similarly, when a court evaluating an agreement entered into for
an anticompetitive purpose holds it in violation of section 1 on the ground
that the restraint imposed by the parties exceeds what was reasonably nec-
essary to the attainment of the lawful main purpose for which it was im-
posed, in a sense the court is not really faulting the parties for their pur-
poses. The true basis for the imposition of liability in that kind of case is
that the probable anticompetitive effects of the agreement exceed any rea-
sonable justification. At that point the two lines of analysis under the Rule
of Reason converge again; for all practical purposes, it would seem, the
criteria for "reasonable necessity" and "least restrictive alternative"
must be the same. 177 Perhaps, though almost seventy years of experience
with the Rule of Reason have not produced an integrated theory of "rea-
sonableness," the materials are at hand.
C. Per Se Rules
Many of the significant developments in the law of restraint of trade
since 1911 have taken the form of rules by which the Supreme Court has
sought to define, in Justice Black's classic formulation, "agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack
of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
may have caused or the business excuse for their use." 178 In theory, these
rules are particularized applications of the Rule of Reason: an agreement
177. The seeds of this notion are present in a number of opinions in which the distinction be-
tween purpose and effect is not carefully observed. See. e.g., Justice Brennan's excellent concurring
opinion in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,270-72 (1963).
178. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1. 5 (1958).
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that has all of the characteristics specified in such a rule is unreasonably
anticompetitive "per se."
Such rules can simplify restraint-of-trade determinations in several
ways. Where a Rule of Reason analysis involves an inquiry into primary
purpose, a per se rule might provide that agreements entered into for spe-
cific anticompetitive purposes are unlawful, regardless of what else the
parties may have had in mind. On the effects side, the usual full-scale
investigation required by the Rule of Reason can be cut off in appropriate
cases by stipulation that agreements with certain kinds of anticompetitive
effects are unlawful, no matter what good they may do. Per se rules can
also be drawn to prohibit certain conduct, either by itself or in conjunc-
tion with other factors. 179
In practice, the per se rules are a mixed bag. Some of them are so
poorly defined that it is impossible to say in which of the above classes
(purpose, effect, or conduct) they fall. 180 Two of the better ones, the
price-fixing rule and the rule against tying arrangements, serve to illus-
trate the points important here. The price-fixing rule is an example of a
rule that will condemn agreements entered into for a particular purpose,
whether they have provable anticompetitive effects or not. 181 The per se
rule against tying arrangements, by contrast, turns on proof of power and
effect, and will summarily condemn certain classes of agreements entered
into for entirely innocent reasons.
Under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court announced in United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 182 "a combination formed for the pur-
pose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabil-
izing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal
per se." 183 The per se rule against price fixing has endured. In subsequent
decisions the Court has invoked it to condemn not only agreements to
raise prices, 184 but agreements to depress them, 185 peg them at a fixed
179. The law of restraint of trade has been evolving in the direction of per se rules in cases
involving competitive torts. See Hutter, "Dirty Tricks" and Section One of the Sherman Act: Feder-
alizing State Unfair Competition Law, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 239 (1977).
180. A notorious illustration is the putative per se rule against group boycotts. See generally
Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 685 (1979); McCormick, Group Boycotts-Per Se or Not Per Se, That is the Question, 7
SEToN HALL L. REv. 703 (1976).
181. Although a purpose to price fix alone is sufficient to create a per se violation of § 1, see
notes 188-190 and accompanying text infra, in several cases the Court has also held, without any
inquiry into purpose, that a combination with the effect of price fixing violates § 1. See Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781-83, 785 (1975); United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S.
333,337 (1969); Unied States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293,296 (1945).
182. 310U.S. 150(1940).
183. Id. at 223.
184. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
185. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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minimum, 186 and stabilize them against the pressure of declining de-
mand.' 87 It is one of the few per se rules the lower courts take seriously,
and the only one for the violation of which appreciable numbers of people
have been sentenced to prison.
In one sense the standard formulation of the rule is misleading. As Jus-
tice Douglas noted for the Court in Socony, it is not generally true that
"both a purpose and a power to fix prices are necessary for the establish-
ment of a conspiracy under § 1 of the Sherman Act." 88 In particular
cases venue or other procedural considerations may require, as they did in
Socony, that the prosecutor or the plaintiff prove that the conspiracy has
had some anticompetitive effect. 189 To establish the substantive violation,
however, such proof is unnecessary: "It is the 'contract, combina-
tion . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce' which § 1 of
the Act strikes down, whether the concerted activity be wholly nascent or
abortive on the one hand, or successful on the other." 190
What makes the price-fixing rule a per se rule is the controlling effect
of proof that the parties acted with a particular kind of anticompetitive
purpose. Garden-variety anticompetitive purposes can be justified in sec-
tion 1 cases by proof that the bad purposes were subordinate to lawful
main ones. Agreements entered into for the purpose of raising, depress-
ing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing prices cannot. Any price-fixing agree-
ment is a "threat to the central nervous system of the economy";19' in
cases involving such agreements "[i]t makes no difference whether the
motives of the participants are good or evil . . "192
Notwithstanding the courts' extensive reliance on the Socony rule since
1940, suspicion persists that some classes of agreements that fall within
its literal condemnation are not in fact illegal per se. ' 93 Since Socony the
186. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
187. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
188. 310 U.S. at 224 n.59.
189. Id.: see United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 402-04 (1927).
190. 310 U.S. at 224 n.59. Accord, McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980): "If
establishing jurisdiction [in a § I case] required a showing that the unlawful conduct itself had an
effect on interstate commerce, jurisdiction would be defeated by a demonstration that the alleged
restraint failed to have its intended anticompetitive effect. This is not the rule of our cases."
191. 310U.S.at224n.59.
192. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 310 (1956). Thus, for exam-
ple, in the Socony case, the Court affirmed criminal convictions entered on verdicts returned on in-
structions charging the jury in effect to disregard the evidence in the record that the parties' purpose
in conspiring to raise prices was to preserve productive capacity that would be needed in the future, in
furtherance of an announced federal policy. 310 U.S. at 210-I1.
193. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, §§ 76-77. Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.. 441
U.S. I (1979) (BMI's blanket licensing agreements held not to be price fixing in violation of the per
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Supreme Court has yet to hold lawful under section 1, however, an agree-
ment that fails the Socony test. The mandate of the rule itself is clear:
Juries in price-fixing cases are to be charged that the determination that
the defendants' agreement was "in restraint of trade" does not depend in
any way on whether their purpose to fix prices was their main one, 194 or
whether they actually brought it off. 195
By contrast to the rule against price fixing, the per se rule against tying
arrangements makes no mention of purpose at all. A tying arrangement is
defined as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at
least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other sup-
plier.' 1 96 Only some tying arrangements are unlawful per se. The stan-
dard formulation is Justice Black's for the Court in Northern Pacific Rail-
way v. United States: tying arrangements are "unreasonable in and of
themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect
to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market
for the tied product and a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce
is affected." 197 Ostensibly, an agreement or pattern of agreements that
meets these conditions is unlawful regardless of the seller's purposes. In
practice, the rule is generally treated as establishing only a presumption
of illegality, rebuttable by a showing that the tie was essential to achieve
one or another of certain good ends. In tying cases the burden ofjustifica-
se rule.); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (con-
certed refusal of engineers to bid on jobs, while illegal, held not to be "price fixing").
194. See 2 E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 55.22 (3d
ed. 1977):
A conspiracy to fix prices in or affecting interstate trade and commerce is unlawful, eveni
though the conspiracy may be formed or engaged in for what appear to the conspirators to be
laudable motives.
A price-fixing conspiracy, such as charged in the indictment, cannot therefore be justified
under the law, even though the conspiracy may have been formed, or engaged in, to prevent or
halt ruinous competition, or to eliminate the evils of price cutting, or to give each competitor
what the conspirators think is his fair share of the market.
195. See id. § 55.23:
The proof need not show that the members of the alleged conspiracy did any act or thing to
further, or accomplish, any object or purpose of the agreement or arrangement or understanding.
Nor is it necessary for the proof to show that any of the accused actually adopted, or followed, or
adhered to, any price schedule or formula or list which may have been agreed upon or arranged
or understood.
The gist of the crime charged in the indictment is knowingly making or arriving at an agree-
ment, or arrangement, or understanding, in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and com-
merce; that is to say, what the law forbids is the act of knowingly becoming a party to or member
of a conspiracy such as charged in the indictment.
196. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (footnote omitted).
197. Id. at 6.
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tion is clearly on the defendant; if the defendant fails to bear it, the ar-
rangement is in restraint of trade, though proof of anticompetitive pur-
pose is entirely lacking in the case.
"Tying agreements," the Court has observed, "serve hardly any pur-
pose beyond the suppression of competition." '1 98 While some few tying
arrangements may be voluntary on both sides, "[i]n the usual case only
[the seller's] control of the supply of the tying device, whether conferred
by patent monopoly or otherwise obtained, could induce a buyer to enter
one." 199 In Standard Oil Co. and Standard Stations, Inc. v. United
States,200 this reasoning led the Court to conclude that "[t]he existence of
market control" in the tying device warrants a "presumption" that the
restraint on competition resulting from the arrangement is unreason-
able. 20 1 The per se rule of Northern Pacific purports to make that pre-
sumption conclusive. In fact, however, no holding of the Supreme Court
goes that far. In Northern Pacific itself, the Court noted that the defendant
railroad's purpose in tying freight services to land leases was "to stifle
competition." 20 2 Presented squarely with claims that a tying arrangement
was necessary to preserve "good will" in the tying product, the Court has
twice rejected the claims on the ground, not that such claims if proven
afford no defense, but that on the facts of the case there were less restric-
tive altematives. 203
In the lower courts today, the prevailing view appears to be that proof
that the elements of the Northern Pacific per se rule are made out in a
given case does not cut off further inquiry into the reasonableness of the
restraint. If the defendant's sole or primary purpose was anticompetitive,
of course the arrangement violates section 1.204 The plaintiff need not,
however, prove bad purpose at all-he or she may stand on a showing
under the per se rule. 205 In that event the burden shifts to the defendant to
198. Standard Oil Co. and Standard Stations, Inc. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293.305 (1949).
199. Id. at 306.
200. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
201. Id. at 306.
202. 356 U.S. at 8.
203. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1947): IBM Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131, 138-40 (1936).
204. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Scaly, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 835 (7th Cir. 1978). cert.
denied. 440 U.S. 930 (1979); Advance Bus. Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 66 (4th
Cir. 1969); Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832, 840 (4th Cir. 1960): United States v. General
Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376,412 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
205. In a number of the reported cases, the analysis simply ends at this point, the court holding
the defendant liable under the per se rule. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38
(1962); Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1976): Detroit
City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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prove a legitimate business reason for the tie. 20 6 The range of legitimate
business reasons that will justify a tying arrangement otherwise unlawful
under the Northern Pacific test has not been defined. Thus, whether it
includes all purposes that might support a defense in a Rule of Reason
case is an open question. Clearly at least two purposes will support a de-
fense even in a per se case: establishment of consumer confidence in a
novel product, 207 and protection of the reputation of a trademark against
debasement by association with inferior goods. 208
In sum, tying arrangements that fulfill the criteria of the per se rule in
terms of power and effect are presumed to be unlawful without the neces-
sity of proof as to the purposes for which they were imposed, but the
presumption is not conclusive. A defendant whose purpose was wholly
innocent may still lose; the arrangement violates section 1 unless the in-
nocent purpose is one that justifies an exception to the per se rule, and the
tie has been imposed in the least restrictive form possible. 209
Rhetoric aside, no practice that has been made the subject of a per se
rule "lack[s] any redeeming virtue." 210 All, including price fixing and
tying, sometime promote competition in some respects. The important
question in each instance is whether the gains from a bright-line prohibi-
tion, in terms of predictability and enforceability, outweigh the costs. A
rule that imposes liability without the usual-full-scale inquiry into primary
purpose and net effect may condemn some agreements that do more good
than harm-but defining "restraint of trade" in terms so clear that a
breach invites the harsher sanctions of the Sherman Act may also deter
the formation of a great many agreements that do more harm than good.
206. Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 46 (5th Cir. 1976); Switzer Bros., Inc. v.
Locklin, 297 F.2d 39, 46 (7th Cir. 1961); Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 395 F. Supp.
735, 766 (D. Md. 1975); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See generally Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying
Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 VAND. L. REV. 283, 324-27 (1980).
207. United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp.. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam,
365 U.S. 567 (1961). Cf. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (Ist Cir.
1961) (maintaining consumer confidence in an established product).
208. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965). See Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Li-
censing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 (1963); text accompanying note 203 supra.
209. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews &
Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 1977); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51-52 (9th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333
F. Supp. 493,505 (D. Del. 1971).
210. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See text accompanying note 178
supra for the entire quotation.
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II. CONTRACT, COMBINATION, OR CONSPIRACY
"Restraint of trade," however defined, is no offense against section 1
of the Sherman Act except in conjunction with a "contract, combination.
• . or conspiracy." The drafters of the Act did not define those terms. All
of them would have been familiar to the drafters in the context of com-
mon-law doctrines and statutes relating to the preservation of competi-
tion;2 11 all suggest collaboration or cooperation among several parties, as
distinguished from the single-firm conduct addressed by the prohibitions
against monopolization and attempts to monopolize in section 2.
If Congress had seen fit to make the consequences of a section 1 viola-
tion differ depending on whether it took the form of a "contract," a
"combination," or a "conspiracy," we would presumably have by now
a reasonably well-developed definition for each term. Congress, how-
ever, did not so provide; nor did it leave any sign of having given serious
thought to the choice of these terms over the many others with simi-
lar connotations-"pool,' ''trust,'' "combine," "confederation,"
''agreement," "arrangement,' ''understanding" 
-routinely employed
in the state antitrust statutes of the day. 2 12
As a result, ninety years after the enactment of the law, clear distinc-
tions between "contract," "combination," and "conspiracy" have not
emerged. The Supreme Court has implied that distinctions do exist. 2 13
More often than not, however, when the Court concludes that section 1
has been violated, it fails to specify which type of violation the record
discloses. Sometimes it has referred to the offending arrangement as a
"conspiracy and combination,- 214 or a "contract or combination.- 2 15
Over time it has shown itself partial to terms that do not appear in the
211. See generally W. LETWIN, LAW & ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 18-99 (1965): H. THo-
RELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 9-53, 155-63 (1955): Dicey. The Combination Laws as
Illustrating tile Relation Between Law and Opinion in England During tile Nineteenth Century, 17
HARV. L. REV. 511 (1904): Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition. 36
YALE L.J. 207, 213-19 (1926).
212. See. e.g., Act of May 20, 1890, 1889-90 Ky. Acts, ch. 1621, § 1:
[Any corporation .. ., partnership, company, firm or individual [that] ... shall ... become
... a party to, or in any way interested in any pool, trust, combine, agreement, confederation or
understanding with any other corporation, [etc.,. for the purpose of regulating or controlling or
fixing the price of any merchandise ... shall be deemed guilty of the crime of conspiracy, and
punished therefor ....
213. On occasion, for example, it has pointedly referred to a given arrangement as a "combina-
tion" rather than a "conspiracy." See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968); United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43, 44 (1960).
214. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944). Cf. United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,224 (1940) (terms used interchangeably).
215. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383,409 (1912).
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statute at all-"agreement, ' 216 "arrangement, ' 217 and "plan. '2 18 Oc-
casionally it has described the violation in terms that seem to be intended
to get at essential characteristics of every section 1 violation-"joint and
collaborative, ' 219 or "collective," 220 or "concerted action.' '221
This flexible approach to the interpretation of the statutory terms has
brought within the ambit of section 1 a wide variety of multi-firm con-
duct. Some of the arrangements struck down in the cases fall conven-
iently into one of the three statutory categories: formal agreements con-
taining anticompetitive terms, drawn up as bilateral contracts; 222
powerful "combinations" of formerly competing corporations, resulting
from the concentration of voting stock in a few hands, in the style of the
original "trusts";223 and "conspiracies" formed along traditional lines
for the purpose of eliminating competition among the conspirators224 or
bringing their competitors to heel. 225 Other arrangements the Court has
held unlawful under section 1 are harder to classify: membership regula-
tions of professional societies; 226 informal agreements to exchange infor-
mation;227 and the yielding by wholesalers to a manufacturer's threats to
terminate those who sell to retailers disapproved by the manufacturer. 228
Had the individual categories in section 1 been specifically defined, some
of these might well have fallen between the cracks.
216. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 782 (1975); United States v. Container
Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598
(1951); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397, 398 (1927); United States v.
Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 577 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290, 342 (1897).
217. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352 (1967); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 30, 43-44 (1930).
218. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939). Cf. American Col-
umn & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 399 (1921) (manufacturers' "Open Competition
Plan" held to be a combination in violation of Act).
219. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 143 (1966).
220. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 348 n.5 (1963).
221. Id.at347.
222. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (group boycott effectuated by a series
of bilateral contracts); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) (cross-
licensing of patents); United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 355-70 (1912) (output contracts);
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (resale price maintenance).
223. See United States v. Union Pac. Ry., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); United States v. American To-
bacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Northern
Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
224. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
225. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
226. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
227. See United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
228. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
Washington Law Review
Perhaps the one generalization the Supreme Court's decisions on this
issue will support is that to make out a section 1 violation there must be
proof of the kind of mutual assent suggested by the word "agreement."
The requirements of the Act have in general been held satisfied only when
the record disclosed an exchange of commitments, each party making a
commitment contingent on commitments by others, and expecting some
benefit from their performance. Consciously parallel conduct-action
taken by several parties, each in the knowledge that the others are taking
similar action-may be evidence of the relationship the Act requires, 2 9
but the evidence must also support an inference that the parties' conduct
is interdependent230 in the sense that each is not only aware of the others'
conduct, but is depending on it. The key to section I liability, in the
words of Chief Justice Stone in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States, 231 is the "[a]cceptance . . . of an invitation to participate in a
plan.' 232 From the perspective of any individual member, the core of the
combination or conspiracy is a plan known to him and others, composed
of a job for him and jobs for them. His knowledge that the plan has been
proposed does not jeopardize him; liability attaches only when he and at
least one other signify, by words or conduct, that they accept the plan and
will do their part.
This doctrine meshes nicely with the doctrine that concerted action
may be held to be an unlawful restraint of trade under section 1, though
the parties are not shown to have acted with any anticompetitive purpose,
if their conduct is unreasonably anticompetitive in its effects. -33 In order
to reach such conduct under section 1, "contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy" must be defined to include more than traditional conspiracy
among parties who share a common unlawful purpose. The requirements
of the doctrine are well met by a definition simply in terms of agreement,
or acceptance of a common plan. The fact that somebody has accepted a
plan says nothing in itself about his or her purposes.2 34 They may be
229. See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537. 540-41
(1954): "To be sure, business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact
finder may infer agreement.... But this Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior
conclusively establishes agreement, or, phrased differently, that such behavior constitutes a Sherman
Act offense."
230. See Turner, The Definition ofAgreement Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655.
657-63 (1962).
231. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
232. Id. at 227.
233. See text accompanying notes 90-177 supra.
234. "Quite clearly." LaFave and Scott observe in their analysis of the mental components of
conspiracy as traditionally defined.
there may be an intent to agree without there also being a common intent to achieve an unlawful
objective, as where A and B agree to bum certain property and A knows the property belongs to
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"lawful" or "unlawful"; they may be the same as those of the other
parties, or they may not.
The importance of a good fit between the doctrines defining "contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy" and "restraint of trade" becomes clear
when one compares two forms of horizontal price fixing-a formal cartel
like the defendants' in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,235 and
a simple agreement to exchange price information such as the one in
United States v. Container Corp.2 36
When the Addyston Pipe and Steel Company and the other five firms
engaged in the manufacture of cast-iron pipe in the southeastern United
States agreed to appoint a central committee to determine the price at
which any of them would be permitted to bid on any contract in the re-
gion, and as a result the prices at which they all sold pipe rose to a print
just below the price at which foundries outside the region could afford to
ship pipe to customers within it,237 none of the six could plausibly deny
that reduction of price competition among them was one of the results
they sought to achieve. 238 Under the Rule of Reason, their agreement was
"in restraint of trade" unless they could establish an overriding lawful
main purpose; under the present-day per se rule against price-fixing, even
that would not have saved it. And on a definition of "contract, combina-
tion . . . or conspiracy" along the lines of traditional conspiracy, their
agreement would qualify: the record disclosed not only an intent to agree,
but an intent tO achieve a common anticompetitive purpose. 239
An agreement among manufacturers to exchange current price infor-
mation on request requires a more subtle analysis. Depending on the cir-
cumstances, such an exchange may injure competition, or promote and
facilitate it.240 If such an agreement chills price competition and raises the
market price above competitive levels, the proof may show that all of the
C but B (perhaps because he has been misled by A) believes that the property belongs to A.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scotr, supra note 4, § 61, at 464. Antitrust doctrine under § I dispenses with the
requirement of an intent to achieve an unlawful objective. It does not, I believe, dispense with the
requirement of an intent to agree. "The substantive law of trade conspiracies requires some con-
sciousness of commitment to a common scheme." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884,
890 (7th Cir. 1963). See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 n.20
(1978) (Court distinguishes between intent to agree and intent to "effectuate the object of the conspir-
acy").
235. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See generally text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
236. 393 U.S. 333 (1969). See generally text accompanying notes 121-126 supra.
237. 175 U.S. at 235-36.
238. See id. at 240-42.
239. Id. at 243.
240. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, § 94. Compare Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States,
268 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1925) with United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441
n. 16, 457-58 (1978).
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parties entered into the agreement with exactly that end in view. On the
other hand, it may not. The proof may show, instead, that some or all of
the parties entered into it in order to prevent "fraud" on the part of pur-
chasers who misrepresent the prices at which other firms have offered to
sell, 24 1 or in order to obtain the information necessary to determine
whether they could lawfully cut their prices to selected customers.2 42 The
smaller firms in the industry may be able to show that they had no real
expectations from the agreement, seldom were asked for any information,
never asked for any themselves, and agreed to the exchange in the first
place solely to get the larger firms to leave them alone. The court may
well conclude, as the Supreme Court did in Container Corp., that the
agreement is "in restraint of trade" by virtue of its unreasonably anti-
competitive effects. Under section 1, however, the parties cannot even be
enjoined from implementing the agreement unless it qualifies as a "con-
tract, combination . . . or conspiracy." A definition of that element in
terms of acceptance of a common plan brings within the prohibition of the
Act unjustifiably anticompetitive arrangements such as this one, which a
definition in terms of common unlawful purpose would put beyond the
reach of the law.
From the decisions of the Supreme Court in cases like Container
Corp., it is clear that proof of anticompetitive purpose is not in fact re-
quired to make out "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" under
section 1.243 In horizontal cases, proof simply of agreement among com-
petitors appears to be enough: "Acceptance by competitors . . . of an
invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if
carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an
unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act." 244 In vertical cases some-
241. See Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
242. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,447-59 (1978).
243. See id. at 446 n.22 (1978) (citing cases): text accompanying notes 93-127 supra.
244. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939). Compare these jury
instructions-all, I believe, correct under the Court's decisions:
(I) United States v. Huckaba & Sons Constr. Co., Crim. Nos. S-CR 74-3 through S-CR 74-9
(S.D. Ill. 1976), instruction reprinted in CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 10, at 54: "A
conspiracy under Section I of the Sherman Act is an agreement by two or more persons or corpora-
tions to accomplish a common objective which would result in an unreasonable restraint of interstate
commerce.
(2) Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd, 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962), instruction reprihted
in 1972 CIVIL JURY INSTRucrIONS, supra note 11, at 37: "A conspiracy under the antitrust law is an
understanding between two or more persons with respect to engaging in a course of conduct. It is not
necessary to find an express agreement in order to find conspiracy. It is enough that uniformity of
action is contemplated by the defendants .... "
(3) Kenmore-Louis Theatre Inc. v. Loew's Boston Theatres, Inc., Civ. No. 59-184-J (D. Mass.
1963), instruction reprinted in 1972 CIVIL JURY INSTRUcTIONS, supra note 11, at 22: "[The] evidence
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thing more is required, but it is not anticompetitive purpose. Under the
doctrine of United States v. Colgate & Co., 245 certain anticompetitive
agreements between suppliers and customers are exempt from condemna-
tion under the Act. In the application of this doctrine it is the supplier's
tactics that matter, not his reasons. Though his purposes be wholly anti-
competitive, he may lawfully secure adherence to his conditions by
means that do not "go beyond his mere declination to sell to a customer
who will not observe his announced policy.'"246 If, however, he refuses
to stop there, and "employs other means which effect adherence, " 247 the
resulting agreement comes within the ambit of section 1. And in cases
involving supplier-customer agreements effectuated by means not privi-
leged under Colgate, as in cases involving agreements among competi-
tors, the absence of proof of bad purposes is not controlling.
"[A]ssuming nonpredatory motives and business purposes," the court
must ascertain whether "the effect upon competition in the marketplace is
substantially adverse .... It is only if the conduct is now unlawful in its
impact on the marketplace ... that protection is achieved. '248
III. SANCTIONS
Under traditional conspiracy doctrine, one is civilly or criminally liable
as a conspirator only if one shares in the common unlawful purpose of the
conspiracy. 249 As the foregoing analysis shows, in the case of agreements
that violate section 1, common unlawful purpose may be entirely lacking.
The question thus arises whether the mere act of entering, without a
wrongful purpose, into an agreement that proves to have unreasonably
anticompetitive effects, renders a party liable to the full range of Sherman
Act sanctions, including treble damages and criminal punishment.
It would be surprising if the answer were yes. To enjoin the Container
must prove the existence of a continuous course of conduct or plan which each alleged member of the
conspiracy accepts and which has the effect ofunreasonably restraining trade."
245. 250 U.S. 300,307 (1919):
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the...
right of trader or manufacturer... freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties
with whom he will deal; and, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under
which he will refuse to sell.
246. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,43 (1960).
247. Id. at 44.
248. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365,375 (1967).
249. As to civil liability, see 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 16 (1967); Burdick, Conspiracy as a
Crime, and as a Tort, 7 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 245-47 (1908). As to criminal liability, see W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 4, § 61, at 464-66; Wechsler, Jones & Kom, The Treatment of
Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 957,
968-70 (1961).
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Corp. defendants250 was one thing; to have branded them as felons would
have been quite another. The doctrine that anticompetitive purpose is in-
essential to a section 1 violation has evolved primarily in suits for injunc-
tive relief under section 1. In that context, it serves Congress' purposes
well. How it applies or should apply in felony prosecutions and treble
damage actions is far less clear.
The imposition of criminal sanctions and treble damages seems clearly
appropriate in the case of agreements entered into primarily for anticom-
petitive purposes, or for purposes (like the purpose to fix prices) con-
demned by a widely understood per se rule. In these cases the traditional
mens rea requirements of the criminal law, 25 1 and the element of "mal-
ice" or "wilfulness" associated in tort law with punitive damages, 252 are
fully made out. 253 The public interest in deterring the formation of such
agreements is very great, and cannot be well served in any other way. 254
The problem arises from the fact that some agreements are also to be
held to violate section 1 though their actuating purposes were neutral or
benign, or though there is no credible evidence as to what those purposes
were. To convict the parties to such agreements as felons on the same
evidence that sufficed to prove the basic violation of the substantive stan-
dards of the Act is almost certainly wrong. In many such instances crimi-
nal punishment will be unfair. Though it has been held that the Rule of
Reason is not unconstitutionally vague as a criminal standard, 255 it still
250. See generally text accompanying notes 121-127 & 240-243 supra.
251. See generally United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436-46 (1978):
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 4. §§ 27-28.
252. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (4th ed. 1971).
253. See also Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act En-
forcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 412-14 (1978). Compare the summary of the prosecutorial
policy of the Antitrust Division in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 110 (1967):
The solution of the Antitrust Division to [the] problem of potential unfairness has been to lay
down the firm rule that criminal prosecutions will be recommended to the Attorney General only
against willful violations of the law. and that one of two conditions must appear to be shown to
establish willfulness. First, if the rules of law alleged to have been violated are clear and estab-
lished-describing per se offenses-willfulness will be presumed. The most common criminal
violation of the antitrust laws is price fixing; upwards of 80 percent of the criminal cases filed
charge conspiracies to fix prices. The Supreme Court held more than 30 years ago that price
fixing was a per se violation of the law-one for which no justification or defense could be
offered .... Second, if the acts of the defendants show intentional violations-if through cir-
cumstantial evidence or direct testimony it appears that the defendants knew they were violating
the law or were acting with flagrant disregard for the legality of their conduct-willfulness will
be presumed.
254. Enormous pressures may be brought to bear on executives to enter into such agreements.
See Bower, A Managerial View of Compliance, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 498 (1977).




seems intolerably hard that the consequence of a reasonable failure to
predict correctly how a jury will decide a question of "reasonable neces-
sity" 256 or "net effect on competition" 2 57 should be a felony conviction.
If that is in fact the consequence of such an error, the threat of criminal
sanctions is highly likely to deter the formation of agreements from which
the public would benefit. Whether the corresponding gains from deter-
rence would balance the losses is at least open to doubt. Even if on bal-
ance the deterrent effects were beneficial, questions would remain as to
the legitimacy of using the criminal sanction in this way to punish con-
duct which in the eyes of many is not morally reprehensible.2 58
If the Sherman and Clayton Acts259 were held to require that every
party to an agreement unlawful under section I is liable to every sanction
provided for violations of that provision, the substantive doctrines of the
Act would be placed under intolerable strain. For many years the courts
have managed to avoid absurd consequences resulting from the failure of
the statute to distinguish among violations for different remedial pur-
poses, without confronting the problem directly. In 1978, in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 260 the Supreme Court squarely ad-
dressed the problem for the first time, and resolved it in a way that bodes
well for the future development of the law.
Before the Court in the Gypsum case were seven defendants-four cor-
porations and three individuals-appealing their convictions for combi-
nation and conspiracy in restraint of trade in the manufacture and sale of
gypsum wallboard in violation of section 1.261 At the close of their trial
256. See text accompanying notes 82-88 supra.
257. See text accompanying notes 158-168 supra.
258. The perspective of the defense bar is well stated in Mercurio, Antitrust Crimes: Time for
Legislative Definition, 51 NoTRE DAME LAW. 437 (1976). It has been suggested that potential anti-
trust defendants prefer a state of uncertainty in the substantive law of antitrust, in part because it
makes these kinds of arguments possible. See Adams, The "Rule of Reason": Workable Competition
or Workable Monopoly?, 63 YALE L.J. 348, 350-53 (1954).
259. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); note 25 supra.
260. 438U.S.422(1978).
261. The opinion of the Third Circuit in the case summarizes the proceedings at trial:
The government's case on price fixing centered on a practice appellants call[ed] "verifica-
tion." An officer of one gypsum board manufacturer would telephone a competing firm's officer
to determine the price at which the competitor was offering gypsum board to a specific cus-
tomer. The scope, purpose, and duration of this activity [were] sharply disputed by the parties.
The Government contend[ed] that the purpose of verification was to enable competitors to stabil-
ize prices and "police" agreed-upon increases, that the calls involved broad discussions of pre-
sent and future pricing policies, that the appellants verified daily, and that they continued to do
so until 1973. Appellants insist[ed] that the only purpose of the calls was to ensure compliance
with the Robinson-Patman Act... that the conversations were limited in scope and number,
and that the practice had been discontinued, except for a few isolated, unauthorized calls, before
the start of the applicable limitations period, December 27, 1968. There [was] evidence to sup-
port each claim of both sides.
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the judge had charged the jury that in deciding whether to convict the
defendants of price fixing on the evidence pertaining to their agreement to
exchange current price information, it must determine whether they had
acted "for the purpose of raising, fixing, maintaining, and stabilizing
prices." 262 He then charged the jury on the significance of proof in the
record that the defendants' exchange of information pursuant to agree-
ment had had anticompetitive effects. First, he said, "if you decide that
the effect of these exchanges was to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize the
price of gypsum wallboard, then you may consider these [exchanges] as
evidence of the mutual agreement or understanding alleged in the indict-
ment to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize list prices.'"263 Then he elabo-
rated: "The law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natural
consequences of his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the exchanges of pric-
ing information was to raise, fix, maintain and stabilize prices, then the
parties to them are presumed, as a matter of law, to have intended that
result. "264
Holding that the jury had been erroneously instructed concerning the
legal significance of proof of anticompetitive effects, the Supreme Court
reversed all seven convictions. 265 The basic question, as Chief Justice
Burger posed it in his opinion for the majority, was "whether intent is an
element of a criminal antitrust offense." 266 The answer was yes: "[W]e
hold that a defendant's state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal
antitrust offense which must be established by evidence and inferences
drawn therefrom . . . . We are unwilling to construe the Sherman Act as
mandating a regime of strict-liability criminal offenses." 2 67 As to the
kind of "intent" required, in the Court's view the alternatives came down
to two, corresponding to the respective definitions of "purpose" and
"knowledge" in the Model Penal Code:
Our question . . . is whether a criminal violation of the antitrust laws re-
quires, in addition to proof of anticompetitive effects, a demonstration that
the disputed conduct was undertaken with the "conscious object" of pro-
ducing such effects, or whether it is sufficient that the conduct is shown to
have been undertaken with knowledge that the proscribed effects would
most likely follow. 268
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1977). aff'd, 438 U.S. 422
(1978).
262. 438 U.S. at 472 (Rehnquist. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 430.
265. Seven Justices concurred in the reversal. Five joined with Chief Justice Burger in Part II of
his opinion for the Court, the part discussed in the text.




Traditionally, according to the commentators, either "purpose" or
"knowledge" satisfied the mens rea requirement for crime. Any defen-
dant who acted with either the desire to injure competition or the aware-
ness that it would be injured was "consciously behaving in a way the law
prohibits, and such conduct is a fitting object of criminal punishment.' '269
Accordingly, the Court concluded that "action undertaken with knowl-
edge of its probable consequences and having the requisite anticompeti-
tive effects can be a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal liability
under the antitrust laws.'"270
It remained to apply this holding to the case before the Court. The trial
judge had instructed the jurors that if they found that the defendants' in-
formation exchange stabilized prices, they must find that this had been the
defendants' intent. This was error, for "although it would be correct to
instruct the jury that it may infer intent from an effect on prices, ulti-
mately the decision on the issue of intent must be left to the trier of the
fact alone." 2 7 1
From the standpoint of the law of purpose and effect in cases arising
under section 1 generally, the significant thing about the Gypsum decision
is that the Court, after lengthy consideration, rejected the proposition that
anticompetitive purpose is an indispensable element of a section 1 viola-
tion in a criminal case. Answering the defendants' contention that the
Court's own precedents required that they be acquitted unless they were
proven to have acted with the purpose of injuring competition, the Court
cited a long list of civil precedents, including Container Corp., to show
that it was not so. 272 Since the Court first held in the Trans-Missouri case
in 1897273 that anticompetitive purpose is not an indispensable element of
a section 1 violation, it has never been clear whether the doctrine applied
in criminal as well as civil cases. Gypsum makes it clear. After Gypsum,
in any criminal case involving an agreement with unreasonably anticom-
petitive effects, proof that two or more defendants sought to attain a
"common unlawful purpose" is unnecessary to conviction. 274
268. Id. at 444. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
269. 438U.S. at445.
270. Id. at 444.
271. Id.at 446.
272. Id. at 446 n.22.
273. See text accompanying notes 103-106 supra.
274. In a footnote to the opinion the Court distinguished between civil and criminal violations of
§ 1: "Our analysis focuses solely on the elements of a criminal offense under the antitrust laws, and
leaves unchanged the general rule that a civil violation can be established by proof of either an unlaw-
ful purpose or an anticompetitive effect." 438 U.S. at 436 n.13. The thrust of that distinction is not
clear. Plainly the point is not that in criminal cases, unlike civil cases, proof of anticompetitive ef-
fects is required: "[W]e do not mean to suggest," the Chief Justice noted elsewhere in the opinion,
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While it may at first appear that the Court in Gypsum simply substituted
"knowledge" for the traditional "purpose" requirement in criminal con-
spiracy cases, in fact the opinion went a step beyond that. In the tradi-
tional formulation, no party is liable for criminal conspiracy unless at
least two parties share a common unlawful purpose. After Gypsum, the
corresponding doctrine in section 1 cases would be that no party is liable
criminally on the strength of his "guilty knowledge" unless at least one
other party to the same agreement had that knowledge. It is very hard to
see why this should be the law, and the Court's opinion in Gypsum
strongly implies that it is not. Throughout the opinion, the Court treated
criminal guilt in a section I case as an entirely individual matter. Liability
under section I is "predicated on the knowing involvement of each de-
fendant, considered individually, in the conspiracy charged."- 275 In the
context of a criminal prosecution under section 1, "the perpetrator's
knowledge of the anticipated consequences is a sufficient predicate for a
finding of criminal intent. "276 No party is criminally liable because of
what any other party knew; and conversely, no party who foresaw the
anticompetitive consequences of the agreement, and proceeded to imple-
ment it regardless, is exonerated because his partners were more naive. 277
Though the Court in Gypsum supported its reasoning with precedents
in civil cases, it took pains to make clear that it intended to leave the law
of section 1 for civil cases undisturbed. The opinion is carefully qualified
throughout. "Our analysis," the Chief Justice wrote, "focuses solely on
the elements of a criminal offense under the antitrust laws . . . '"278 The
legislative history of the Sherman Act, he continued, "indicates that Con-
gress was fully aware of the traditional distinctions between the elements
of civil and criminal offenses and .. .did not intend to do away with
"that conduct undertaken with the purpose of producing anticompetitive effects would not also sup-
port criminal liability, even if such effects did not come to pass." Id. at 444 n.21. Equally plainly.
the footnote cannot mean that anticompetitive purpose must be proven in criminal cases: in the text
the Court analyzed that issue and resolved it the other way. Id. at 445-46.
The Court's point, therefore, must have been that criminal violations require proof of mens rea and
civil violations ordinarily do not. The "general rule that a . . .violation can be established by proof
either of an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect" is in fact a rule for civil and criminal cases
alike. To make out a criminal violation, however, unless the prosecution can establish anticompeti-
tive purpose, it must establish, in addition to the anticompetitive effects that would suffice for civil
liability, foreknowledge of those effects by the defendant. See United States v. Krasn. 614 F.2d
1229, 1236-37 (9th Cir. 1980); Garvey, The Sherman Act and the Vicious Will. 29 CATFt. U.L. REV.
389, 396 (1980).
275. 438 U.S. at463.
276. Id. at 446.
277. See also comment to MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, at 104-05 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960)
(Code also takes "unilateral approach" to conspiracy).
278. 438 U.S. at 436 n.13.
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them.''279 Concluding that "the criminal offenses defined by the Sher-
man Act should be construed as including intent as an element," 280 the
Court characterized this conclusion as "[a]n accommodation of the civil
and criminal provisions of the Act." 281 The importance of this accommo-
dation is clear: parties to an agreement may be held liable to injunction or
answerable in damages for their participation in an agreement, on evi-
dence well short of what would be required to convict them of any
crime. 282
Notwithstanding the Court's disclaimers, the Gypsum opinion has im-
portant implications for one class of civil cases under section 1. Prior to
Gypsum, the courts took for granted that all conspirators in restraint of
trade were jointly and severally liable in treble damages 283 to anyone who
had standing to sue and had suffered the kind of injury for which the law
allowed recovery. 284 They -did not, in other words, distinguish in these
cases between violation and liability to sanction, 285 just as they did not in
other kinds of cases under section 1. In Gypsum the Supreme Court, un-
fazed by the lapse of eighty-eight years since the passage of the Sherman
Act, addressed the proposition that all section 1 violators are criminals as
if it were new, and held that it contravened the original legislative intent.
The parallel proposition regarding liability to treble damages is also open
now to reexamination.
There are several possible outcomes. The same mens rea requirements
might be imposed in private treble damage actions as in criminal cases.
The Court's opinion in Gypsum, with its sharp distinctions in dictum be-
tween criminal and civil cases under section 1, is extremely hostile to that
alternative. 286 Another alternative is strict liability. In the context of a
treble damage statute, the pros and cons of strict liability will merit a
careful new look.
279. Id. at 443 n.19.
280. Id. at 443.
281. Id.at443n.19.
282. The Chief Justice noted specifically that the Court's analysis "leaves unchanged the general
rule that a civil violation can be established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompeti-
tive effect." Id. at 436 n. 13. As the rest of the opinion makes clear, the distinction between civil and
criminal cases is that criminal conviction requires, not proof of anticompetitive purpose, but proof of
knowledge of probable anticompetitive effects. See note 274 supra.
283. See, e.g., Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (S.D.
Cal.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 842 (1968); cases cited, id. nn.4-8.
284. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
285. The few lower-court decisions that raise the problem of limiting treble damage exposure to
the most culpable parties have generally analyzed it in terms of the conditions for membership in an
antitrust conspiracy generally. See, e.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 23 1-33
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers
Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
286. See also Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558,570-71 (1951).
Washington Law Review
There is intermediate ground. To date it is almost entirely unexplored.
Now that the Court has broken out the problem of remedy under section 1
from the problems of substantive violation, the courts are free to treat the
treble damage action under section 1 as a peculiar kind of action in tort.
Viewing it that way, it would not be surprising if in some future case the
Supreme Court observed that its language in Gypsum dismissing reckless-
ness and negligence as concepts which "have no place" in antitrust jur-
isprudence 287 was unnecessary to its decision and, on reflection, prema-
ture.
IV. CONCLUSION
By its terms, section 1 of the Sherman Act punishes conspiracies.
Perceiving that to interpret section 1 in strict accordance with traditional
notions of conspiracy would defeat its purposes, the courts have held that
concerted action may violate the statute though the parties lacked any pur-
pose to bring about the effects the statute aims to prevent. Proof of an
intention to enter into an agreement is essential. Proof of a purpose to
injure competition is merely relevant. Agreements entered into for anti-
competitive purposes are unlawful under section 1, whatever their ef-
fects, if they lack a lawful main purpose or if the restraint imposed on
competition exceeds what is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment
of such a purpose. Agreements with actual or probable anticompetitive
effects are unlawful, regardless of their purposes, unless they promote
competition in some way and do that by the least restrictive method avail-
able to the parties, and unless, on balance, they have a positive effect on
competition. Any party to an agreement held unlawful on the strength of
its actual or probable anticompetitive effects is liable to criminal convic-
tion under the Act, whether or not the party acted with the purpose of
causing such effects, if the party knew they were reasonably certain to
occur.
In the years since 1897 the Supreme Court has dealt sensibly and
straightforwardly with a number of the issues that have arisen as a result
of section 1 's emancipation from the constraints of traditional conspiracy
doctrine. Important questions remain for decision-the criteria for "law-
ful" purposes and "procompetitive" effects, the standards for evaluating
less restrictive alternatives, the technique for balancing good and bad ef-
fects to reach a final judgment, and the kind of culpability (if any) re-
quired for liability in treble damages. The thinking reflected in jury in-
287. 438 U.S. at 444.
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structions like those quoted at the outset of this article, equating a section
1 conspiracy with a "partnership in criminal purposes," has been obso-
lete for more than eighty years. It is time we buried it.
